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743 
“AVOIDING HARM OTHERWISE”: REFRAMING 
WOMEN EMPLOYEES’ RESPONSES TO THE HARMS 
OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Margaret E. Johnson∗ 
This Article concerns the concepts of employee harm and harm avoidance 
within the liability framework for hostile work environment sexual harassment by 
a supervisor. Whether an employer is liable for supervisor sexual harassment 
depends in part on whether the employee avoids her harm or mitigates her 
damages resulting from the sexual harassment. Despite the law’s interest in 
employee’s harm avoidance, courts have failed to explore fully the vast array of 
harms resulting from sexual harassment and the variety of ways in which an 
employee avoids these multiple harms. This Article reframes the legal discussion 
of an employee’s actions in response to sexual harassment from one that almost 
exclusively focuses on whether the employee failed to report the sexual 
harassment. To assist in the reconceptualization, this Article explores women 
employees’ responses to sexual harassment: the ways in which they are harmed by 
sexual harassment, beyond the act of sexual harassment itself; and the ways in 
which they avoid that harm, beyond simply reporting the sexual harassment. There 
are at least two benefits from this reframing. First, a more inclusive depiction of 
women employees’ injuries from, and responses to, sexual harassment would far 
better inform sexual harassment liability determinations. As a result, the 
determinations can fulfill the legislative intent of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 to encourage and reinforce employees’ efforts to “avoid harm.” Second, 
through this process, there is an opportunity to reveal the existing reality that 
highlights women’s partial agency but often is obscured with the dominant picture 
of a sexual harassment victim as “suffering in silence.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines how concepts of “harm” and “avoidance of harm” 
should inform the liability framework for supervisor sexual harassment in 
employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 In Faragher v. City 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000); see also Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998) (establishing affirmative defense for supervisor liability for 
hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (establishing affirmative defense for supervisor liability for quid pro quo sexual 
harassment under Title VII). 
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of Boca Raton2 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,3 the Supreme Court 
established that once a plaintiff proves that she was subjected to sexual 
harassment by her supervisor that did not involve a tangible employment action,4 
an employer will be vicariously liable unless the employer satisfies a two-part 
affirmative defense.5 The employer must prove both (a) “that the employer 
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing 
behavior” (hereafter the “employer-focused prong”) and (b) “that the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise” (hereafter 
the “employee-focused prong”).6  
2. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
3. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
4. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (stating that “tangible employment action” includes “discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment”); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761 (stating that “tangible employment 
action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits”); see also Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 144 (2004) (approving Ellerth’s definition 
of tangible employment action (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761)).  
5. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
6. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (emphasis added); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added); accord 
Suders, 542 U.S. at 152 (“[T]he plaintiff who alleges no tangible employment action has the duty to 
mitigate harm, but the defendant bears the burden to allege and prove that the plaintiff failed in that 
regard.”). Many insightful articles have been written regarding the affirmative defense to employer 
liability for sexual harassment. E.g., Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The 
Implications of Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 291-339 (2001) [hereinafter Beiner, Sex, Science and Social 
Knowledge] (discussing disconnect between law and actual operation of sexual harassment in 
workplace and recommending changes in court’s assessment, including evaluation of entire workplace 
culture and award of punitive damages); Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in 
Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 131-41 (2001) [hereinafter Beiner, 
Women’s Stories] (discussing how affirmative defense and its interpretation by lower courts does not 
properly reflect reality of how sexual harassment operates in workplace); Louis P. DiLorenzo & Laura 
H. Harshbarger, Employer Liability for Supervisor Harassment After Ellerth and Faragher, 6 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 3, 13-15 (1999) (arguing that affirmative defense inappropriately emphasizes
effect of harassment as opposed to harassment itself for liability determinations); Joanna L. Grossman, 
The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 4 (2003) [hereinafter Grossman, Culture of Compliance] (using social science
and other research to critique legal and extralegal discourse that trumpets policies, complaint
mechanisms, and investigations as effective deterrence and corrective mechanisms for sexual
harassment); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 
U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 720 (2000) [hereinafter Grossman, The First Bite] (explaining that affirmative
defense’s creation of employer’s “safe harbor” to liability unless employer’s own conduct is deficient
limits employees’ compensation for actionable sexual harassment); Michael C. Harper, Employer 
Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 41, 80-81 (1999) (using cost-benefit analysis to analyze how affirmative defense would
resolve remaining questions about employer liability); L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable
Women” Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 721-34 (2007) (comparing courts’
conclusions about reasonableness of victims’ reactions to sexual harassment with research on ways in
which women typically respond to such harassment); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for
Sexual Harassment—Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner
and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 198 (2001) (describing affirmative defense as
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The Supreme Court stated that in proving the employer-focused prong, the 
employer could show whether the employer promulgated a sexual harassment 
policy with a complaint procedure.7 The Court stated that such a showing would 
be relevant, though not dispositive, to satisfying the employer-focused prong.8 
Regarding the employee-focused prong, the Court stated that “a demonstration 
of [plaintiff’s unreasonable failure to use any employer-provided complaint 
mechanism] will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the 
second element of the defense.”9 As discussed throughout this Article, however, 
if the employee avoided harm otherwise, the employer should not be able to 
meet its burden. 
Subsequent case doctrine for supervisor hostile work environment sexual 
harassment has evolved to require, almost without exception, that employees 
report sexual harassment promptly and appropriately through the designated 
employer-mandated channels.10 If the employee fails to report her harasser 
legal standard created to change victim responses to sexual harassment and prevent discrimination in 
workplace and observing that standard is flawed because it is based on “a faulty descriptive account of 
how people and organizations actually behave”); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: 
The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 266 (2004) (stating 
that affirmative defense is flawed because it assumes that victims of sexual harassment report 
harassment, that sexual harassment policies and procedures discourage sexual harassment, and that 
lower courts have failed to interpret properly affirmative defense’s requirement that employers’ 
policies and procedures be effective in deterring sexual harassment); John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, 
and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” Liability: The Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe 
Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace 
Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1401, 1435-36 (2002) (explaining that lower courts have failed to 
implement properly affirmative defense); Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure to 
Hold Employers Strictly Liable for Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on 
Reasonableness, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 616-25 (2006) (arguing for contextualized fact-finding 
regarding whether individual employee unreasonably failed to avoid harm if she decided to submit to 
sexual harassment given her credible fear of retaliation that could result in career or financial harm); 
David Sherwyn, Michael Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1-800” 
Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense 
to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1298-1301 (2001) (arguing that current 
affirmative defense incentivizes employers to do only enough to meet standard and not enough to 
actually aid in prevention and early reporting of sexual harassment); Michael Taylor, Let’s Talk About 
Sex: A Clarification of Employer Liability for Supervisor Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 27 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 607, 640-55 (2001) (proposing solutions to lack of clarity in affirmative defense’s 
definition of supervisor and interpretation of affirmative defense); Martha S. West, Preventing Sexual 
Harassment: The Federal Courts’ Wake-Up Call for Women, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 497 (2002) 
(arguing that federal courts need to require significant action by employers to show effectiveness of 
sexual harassment policies). As seen in these articles, many legal scholars have already provided very 
informative descriptions and critiques of the affirmative defense and its interpretation by the courts. 
Accordingly, this Article seeks to build on that body of scholarship and explore a different area of the 
affirmative defense. Specifically, this Article explores the full meaning and use of the affirmative 
defense as it relates to sexually harassed employees’ harm and avoidance of harm. 
7. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
8. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
9. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
10. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 6, at 1432 n.188 (citing Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243,
246 (2001), for “treating plaintiff’s failure to use employer’s complaint procedure as a complete bar to 
recovery with no discussion of how much harm a reasonably prompt complaint would have 
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appropriately, in most instances, she will be barred from holding the employer 
liable for the sexual harassment to which she was subjected.11 Yet this 
requirement is in tension with the reality of women workers’ lives. The vast 
majority of women employees do not report sexual harassment, and if they do 
report it, most do so after a period of time has elapsed or complain to persons 
that may not be included in the employer’s prescribed procedures for 
complaining.12 
Commentators have discussed thoughtfully aspects of this tension between 
the doctrine and women employees’ reality.13 Even the Supreme Court, in 
creating the footprint for the lower courts’ case law, recognized the 
incongruence. In crafting the affirmative defense to liability for supervisor sexual 
harassment in 1998, the Supreme Court noted that a requirement that employees 
show how they avoided the harm of sexual harassment by formally reporting the 
sexual harassment to their employer stood in contrast to the reality that the vast 
majority of women employees do not complain for various reasons.14 In 
response, the Supreme Court articulated that a reporting requirement would 
hopefully change women employees’ behavior in mitigating this harm.15 But 
since 1998, studies show that reporting behavior has decreased, not increased, in 
frequency despite the requirement.16 The Armed Forces 2002 Sexual 
prevented”).  
11. See, e.g., Watkins v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at *4 (4th Cir.
Nov. 15, 1999) (holding that where employee delayed in reporting hostile environment claim arising 
from her rape, employer was not liable as matter of law). 
12. See, e.g., U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: 
TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 29 (1995) [hereinafter SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE 
FEDERAL WORKPLACE] (noting that inaction is most common reaction to sexual harassment even 
though filing formal complaint is more likely to stop harassment). 
13. See, e.g., Beiner, Women’s Stories, supra note 6, at 117 (“The legal standards the United
States Supreme Court has developed concerning sexual harassment law do not always reflect the 
reality of how sexual harassment operates in the workplace.”); Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife 
Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 374 (2004) (stating that “[t]here is  
. . . a considerable gulf between the legal expectations of courts and the actual behavior of employees” 
because vast majority of women employees do not report sexual harassment and reporting is what law, 
interpreted most narrowly, requires (citing Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 8)); 
Grossman, The First Bite, supra note 6, at 677 (asserting that existing legal doctrine unfairly penalizes 
majority of employees who fail to use formal complaint mechanisms, thereby undermining legal 
system’s ability to compensate employees and pursue gender equality in workplace). 
14. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803.
15. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (stating that limiting employer liability in order to encourage
employees to report offensive conduct before it becomes pervasive fulfills Title VII’s deterrent 
rationale). But see Chamallas, supra note 13, at 377 (“Despite the incentive provided by legal reporting 
requirements, these patterns are unlikely to change because the social science evidence on lack of 
reporting has been so consistent and the pressures not to report are still present in the workplace. 
Thus, when a court regards a victim’s failure to report as presumptively unreasonable, it is making a 
negative judgment that applies to a large majority of sexual harassment victims.”). 
16. RACHEL N. LIPARI & ANITA R. LANCASTER, ARMED FORCES 2002 SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
SURVEY 30 (2003), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/d20040227shs1.pdf [hereinafter 2002 
ARMED FORCES SURVEY]; RACHEL N. LIPARI ET AL., 2004 SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY OF 
RESERVE COMPONENT MEMBERS 15 (2005), http://www.sapr.mil/contents/references/ 
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Harassment Survey showed a decrease of reporting by women.17 This survey 
showed that a smaller percentage of women reported sexual harassment in 2002 
than in 1995.18 The 2004 Sexual Harassment Survey of Reserve Component 
Members showed that sixty-seven percent of women and seventy-eight percent 
of men who were subjected to sexually harassing behavior did not report it.19 
Large percentages of women decided not to report despite the fact that eighty-
five to ninety percent of them reported that they had received the policies setting 
out the employer’s complaint procedures.20 
Yet simply because women employees often do not complain officially 
about the sexual harassment to which they are subjected does not equate to a 
wholesale failure by women employees to respond in any way or otherwise avoid 
harm. Too often this flawed logic is articulated in case law.21 For instance, in 
Jones v. District of Columbia,22 the court correctly identified that the affirmative 
defense to liability in part focuses on whether the plaintiff “avoided suffering 
harm by taking some action.”23 Nonetheless, despite this accurate assertion of 
the rule, the court failed to actually analyze the “avoid harm otherwise” 
component. Therefore, the court failed to analyze whether the plaintiff avoided 
harm when, in response to a sexual advance, the plaintiff screamed, causing 
another employee to intervene and stop the advances.24 The court also failed to 
consider whether the plaintiff avoided harm when she told the harasser to stop.25 
This decision demonstrates the pervasive gap between what employees do when 
they are sexually harassed and what they are credited with doing. The gap seems 
to result in part from the unreasonable expectation by the observer, or judge, of 
the action as to what is a suitable response. If the expectation is that an 
employee must respond to sexual harassment by filing a complaint, then all other 
actions—including those attempts to stop the harassment or mitigate other 
2004%20Sexual%20Harassment%20Survey%20of%20Reserve%20Component%20Members.pdf 
[hereinafter 2004 ARMED FORCES SURVEY].  
17. 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at 30. 
18. Id. (reporting that thirty percent of women subjected to sexually harassing behavior reported
behavior in 2002 versus thirty-eight percent who reported in 1995).  
19. 2004 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at 15. 
20. Id. at 110. The survey included the reasons such persons gave for not reporting the sexual
harassment. These reasons included fear of social reprisals, belief that they had taken care of the 
problem themselves, concern that harassment was not important enough to report, discomfort with 
reporting, view that reporting would achieve nothing, and fear of being labeled a troublemaker if they 
reported. Id. at 71. 
21. See, e.g., MacKenzie v. Potter, No. 04-C-4070, 2006 WL 1005127, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14,
2006) (finding that plaintiff’s failure to take advantage of complaint system was unreasonable and 
therefore employer met second prong of Ellerth/Faragher defense); Jones v. District of Columbia, 346 
F. Supp. 2d 25, 51 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 429 F. 3d 276 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding that 
plaintiff failed to prevent hostile work environment because of her failure to report behavior to
supervisor); Kresko v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (deciding that plaintiff’s
failure to complain indicated that she welcomed her supervisor’s behavior). 
22. 346 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 429 F.3d 276 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
23. Jones, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 50. 
24. Id. at 33, 51. 
25. Id. 
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harms from being sexually harassed—become nonactions or invisible. 
This gap is also evident in conclusions and findings made from workplace 
studies.26 For instance, a federal workplace study often categorized employees’ 
responses to sexual harassment as “inaction.”27 Specifically, in its report, the 
Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) stated that “the most frequently 
occurring reaction to sexual harassment is inaction. The single most common 
response of employees who are targets of sexually harassing behaviors . . . has 
been, and continues to be, to ignore the behavior or do nothing.”28 At the same 
time, however, the report catalogued a vast range of complex employee 
responses to sexual harassment, including confronting the harasser, avoiding the 
harasser, and threatening to tell others about the harassment.29 Such responses 
stand in stark contrast to the conclusion that employees largely fail to act, as 
mentioned above. Subsequent studies similarly showed that employees subjected 
to sexual harassment take many actions in response to sexual harassment.30 
26. See, e.g., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 29
(discussing how efficacy of solutions to harassment depend on one’s perspective as employee, victim, 
supervisor, or official and noting that most victims respond with inaction); 2004 ARMED FORCES 
SURVEY, supra note 16, at 15 (noting that most incidents of sexual harassment were not reported); 
2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at 30 (noting decrease in employees reporting sexually 
harassing behavior from 1995 to 2002).  
27. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 29. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 29-33. Specifically, the report stated that thirty-five percent of victims of sexual
harassment asked or told the harasser to stop, twenty-eight percent avoided the harasser, fifteen 
percent made a joke of it, twelve percent reported it to a supervisor or other friend, ten percent 
threatened to tell or told others, and seven percent went along with the behavior. Id. The report found 
that forty-four percent of the victims ignored it or did nothing. Id. As discussed by several 
commentators those studies that characterized responses as “doing nothing” failed to explore the 
multiplicity of responses, asked open-ended questions about responses, and permitted internal 
responses to be included in survey responses. Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn’t She Just Report 
Him? The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. 
SOC. ISSUES 117, 117-38 (1995).  
30. See JAMES B. GREENLEES ET AL., 2 TABULATIONS OF RESPONSES FROM THE 2002 STATUS OF 
THE ARMED FORCES SURVEY – WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS 1157-1228 (Aug. 2003) (listing 
responses to military sexual harassment survey detailing eighteen possible options when faced with 
harassment). The data in this study includes responses to “Question 65” of the Armed Forces 2002 
Sexual Harassment Survey, which asked: 
To what extent did you . . . 
a. Try to avoid the person(s) who bothered you?
b. Try to forget it? 
c. Tell the person(s) you didn’t like what he or she was doing? 
d. Stay out of the person’s or persons’ way? 
e. Tell yourself it was not really important? 
f. Talk to some of your family about the situation? 
g. Talk to some of your coworkers about the situation?
h. Talk to some of your friends about the situation? 
i. Talk to a chaplain or counselor about the situation? 
j. Try to avoid being alone with the person(s)? 
k. Tell the person(s) to stop? 
750 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
 
Perhaps highlighting the invisibility of such responses to sexual harassment is the 
2002 Armed Forces Survey, which gathered data on, but then did not publish, 
the broad array of actions taken in response to sexual harassment.31 Instead, the 
only responses that the survey reported and analyzed were employees’ official 
reports of the harassment.32 The fact that response data was not reported 
underscores the premise of this Article, which is that responses other than 
reporting are not being discussed in any systematic way—in workplaces, in 
workplace studies, or in the law. Indeed, the label of “inaction” for any response 
to sexual harassment that is not officially reporting the sexual harassment can be 
seen in legal scholarship as well.33 
This Article seeks to bridge this ongoing gap by bringing the reality of 
employees’ harm avoidance actions into sexual harassment doctrine and 
theory.34 The sexual harassment legal liability framework is charged with 
crediting women employees’ actions to avoid harm, and, therefore, the 
documented reality of employees’ actions taken to avoid harm needs to be 
included in this analysis. This gap can only be repaired if employees, employers, 
lawyers, judges, and scholars understand and recognize all of the sexual 
harassment harms and avoidance mechanisms thereto that need to be accounted 
for in determining liability. 
Specifically, this Article focuses on women employees’ responses to sexual 
harassment: the ways in which they are harmed by the sexual harassment, 
beyond the act of sexual harassment itself; the ways in which they respond to 
those harms, beyond simply reporting the sexual harassment; and the 
effectiveness of those responses in avoiding the multiple harms of sexual 
harassment. By recognizing these harm avoidance actions, this Article hopes to 
reframe the discussion of employees’ actions in response to sexual harassment 
from failures to report to complex amalgamations of harms and the effects of 
l. Just put up with it? 
m. Ask the person(s) to leave you alone?
n. Blame yourself for what happened? 
o. Assume the person(s) meant well? 
p. Pray about it? 
q. Pretend not to notice, hoping the person(s) would leave you alone?
r. Do something else in response to the situation?
2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, app. A at 12. The results were not included in the 
survey, but Rachel Lipari did provide the underlying raw data to this author. 
31. 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, app. A at 12. 
32. Id. 
33. See, e.g., Murr, supra note 6, at 609 (using word “inaction” to discuss instances of failure to
report sexual harassment officially).  
34. See generally Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge, supra note 6, at 323-38 (discussing 
inconsistency between legal requirement that women complain about workplace sexual harassment 
and social science research showing that women employees rarely complain); Chamallas, supra note 
13, at 374 (noting that research shows that few victims follow official grievance procedures despite 
expectations implied in legal doctrine); Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 26-27 
(recognizing various ways in which harassed employees seek to avoid harm and observing that these 
employees rarely make formal reports of harassment).  
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employees’ responses thereto in mitigating or otherwise avoiding the damages 
from their supervisors’ sexual harassment.35 
As stated above, women employees36 who are sexually harassed experience 
a wide range of harms and employ a wide range of strategies to avoid the harm. 
The multiple forms of harms resulting from sexual harassment include the sexual 
harassment itself; the stigma of discrimination; the resulting tangible job harm, 
such as a termination or nonpromotion; the resulting intangible job harm, such 
as an abusive work environment and loss of employment advancement; 
economic harm; and emotional, psychological and physical harm.37 In response 
35. As many commentators have noted, the focus on female employees’ failure to complain
about sexual harassment echoes the much-critiqued focus on females’ failure to leave their abusers 
when subjected to domestic violence. See Chamallas, supra note 13, at 375 (contending that asking 
sexual harassment or domestic violence victim why she did not complain or leave is in fact insinuating 
that abuse or harassment either did not occur or was not serious); Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power 
and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1286 
(1992) (noting that Anita Hill’s failure to leave her job with Clarence Thomas was raised to dispute 
truthfulness of her sexual harassment claims, just as battered women’s mere presence in abusive 
relationship raises questions about their claims).  
36. Throughout this Article, I will refer to the sexually harassed employee as female. This
decision is based in part on the statistical information showing that women are more frequently 
sexually harassed in the workplace than men. About fifty percent of women will experience sexual 
harassment during their working lives as opposed to only between fourteen to seventeen percent of 
men. Deborah Erdos Knapp et al., Determinants of Target Responses to Sexual Harassment: A 
Conceptual Framework, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 687, 687 (1997) (citing, inter alia, BARBARA A. 
GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND HARASSMENT ON 
WOMEN, MEN, AND ORGANIZATIONS 46-47 (1985); U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 11 (1988)) [hereinafter AN UPDATE]); 
U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 
36 (1981) [hereinafter IS IT A PROBLEM?]; Louise F. Fitzgerald & Sandra L. Shullman, Sexual 
Harassment: A Research Analysis and Agenda for the 1990s, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 5, 7 (1993); 
Donald B. Mazer & Elizabeth F. Percival, Students’ Experiences of Sexual Harassment at a Small 
University, 20 SEX ROLES 1, 1-22 (1989)). In addition, the Armed Forces 2002 Sexual Harassment 
Survey found that more women than men reported experiencing sexual harassment (twenty-four 
percent of women versus three percent of men). 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at iv. 
Specifically, forty-five percent of women and twenty-three percent of men who reported experiencing 
sexual harassment reported experiencing “Crude/Offensive Behavior,” twenty-seven percent of 
women and five percent of men reported being subjected to “Unwanted Sexual Attention,” eight 
percent of women and one percent of men experienced “Sexual Coercion,” and three percent of 
women and one percent of men reported experiencing “Sexual Assault.” Id. at iii-iv. 
The decision to discuss women employees in this Article is also based on the fact that women 
work at the interstices of various power hierarchies, such as those inherent in supervisor-subordinate 
and male-female relationships that affect the operation of power in the workplace. Kathryn Abrams, 
Subordination and Agency in Sexual Harassment Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
111, 113 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004); see also Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998) (recognizing that supervisor’s power invests his harassing conduct of 
subordinate employee with particularly threatening character).  
37. See infra notes Part III.A.1-2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various harms
sexual harassment causes. This Article, as with many other articles discussing sexual harassment, relies 
on social science research in discussing the real experiences of women employees who are subjected to 
sexual harassment. E.g., Beiner, Women’s Stories, supra note 6, at 131-41 (considering promptness 
requirement for employee reporting under Faragher and Ellerth affirmative defense in light of social 
and medical science research explaining reluctance of female employees to report harassment); 
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to these harms, women who are sexually harassed utilize a wide range of 
strategies to avoid these harms, such as avoiding the harasser, objecting to the 
harasser, formally complaining about the sexual harassment, seeking support 
from friends and family, ignoring thoughts about the sexual harassment, and 
denying that the harassment occurred.38 
To date, most courts and scholars have not recognized the meaning and 
potential power of the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the affirmative 
defense.39 In part, this results from the broader discourse’s narrow construction 
of the concepts of “harm” and “avoid[ing] harm” when discussing the affirmative 
defense to liability.40 In general, judges, lawyers, and academics have discussed 
“harm” as solely synonymous with the act of sexual harassment itself, such as 
sexual touching or advances.41 They have discussed “avoiding harm” as only an 
employee’s complaint to the employer about sexual harassment.42 As a result, 
Grossman, The First Bite, supra note 6, at 723-29 (describing social science research regarding victims’ 
responses to sexual harassment as informing need for additional employer actions, such as sexual 
harassment training); see also, e.g., Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 n.24 (9th Cir. 
2003) (“[I]n some cases, a victim’s particular circumstances may render the failure to seek relief 
through the employer’s available procedures objectively reasonable.” (citing Fitzgerald et al., supra 
note 29, at 121)).  
38. See, e.g., 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, app. A at 12 (listing these and
additional actions women took in response to sexual harassment). 
39. E.g., Taylor v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 700CV145-R, 2001 WL
1012803, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2001) (omitting “avoid harm otherwise” component from 
employee-focused prong); THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING 
SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 172-73 (2005) (recommending that 
“avoid harm otherwise” language should be eliminated because it is so vague); Harper, supra note 6, 
at 80-81 (limiting “avoiding harm otherwise” to avoiding harassment only as opposed to other harms); 
Taylor, supra note 6, at 655 (limiting applicability of “avoid harm otherwise” component to small 
employers or employees who invite harassment (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-08)).  
40. But see Chamallas, supra note 13, at 314 (“I urge recognition of the interrelationship between 
economic harms on the one hand and psychological harms on the other. Because one type of harm 
frequently coexists with the other, or tends to produce the other, I believe it is futile and unwise for 
courts to try to draw sharp lines between economic and other losses. Instead, each should be treated as 
a legitimate, job-related injury worthy of compensation.” (citation omitted)); Murr, supra note 6, at 
608-09 (proposing standard that takes into account victim’s individual circumstances in determining
whether victim reasonably attempted to avoid harm when she did not utilize employer’s official
channels to report harassment). 
41. See, e.g., DiLorenzo & Harshbarger, supra note 6, at 13-15 (discussing fact that affirmative
defense inappropriately focuses on harm sustained by plaintiff not for damages purposes but for 
liability determinations); Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 6 (describing sexual 
harassment as sexual remarks, sexual teasing, sexual touching, and demands or pressure for sexual 
favors); Grossman, The First Bite, supra note 6, at 708 (stating that within context of affirmative 
defense to liability, as opposed to damages, harm referred to means legal harm established by 
actionable hostile environment, not subjective harm felt by employee subjected to any unwelcome 
sexual touching, gesture, or comment regardless of its severity or pervasiveness); Marks, supra note 6, 
at 1425, 1430-37 (critiquing lower courts’ conversion of harm-avoidance doctrine to contributory 
negligence doctrine, but equating harm to sexual harassment and harm-avoidance to formal 
complaints). But see Murr, supra note 6, at 614-15 (providing slightly expanded, but generalized, view 
of harm to include submitting to sexual harassment, job detriment resulting from failure to submit, and 
emotional harm resulting from sexual harassment). 
42. Grossman, The First Bite, supra note 6, at 708 (stating that only harm plaintiff could avoid
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the discourse by courts, lawyers, and scholars often focuses only on what a 
woman employee did not do, namely failing to file a formal complaint of sexual 
harassment pursuant to the company’s policy.43 The employee is perceived as 
having not responded; the many actions actually taken by the employee to avoid 
harm are rendered hidden and insignificant.44 
Instead, the concepts of “harm” and “avoid[ing] harm” should reflect and 
account for the actual experiences and actions taken by women employees 
subjected to supervisor sexual harassment.45 The resuscitation of the full 
meaning of harm and avoidance of harm within women employees’ lives 
provides the opportunity to correct for the to-date unrealistic discussion in legal 
discourse and in the workplace about sexual harassment.46 A more inclusive 
depiction of women employees’ injuries from, and responses to, sexual 
harassment would far better inform liability determinations based on their 
efforts to “avoid harm.” Through this process, there is an opportunity to reveal 
the existing reality that highlights women’s agency47 but often is obscured with 
the dominant picture of a sexual harassment victim as “suffering in silence.”48 As 
such, women’s agency, women’s choices, acts of resistance, self-direction, and 
self-definition,49 within the broader context of systemic oppression through 
entirely is one where “hostile environment develops gradually” because then “the plaintiff might have 
the opportunity to complain before any legally recognizable harm is done”); Marks, supra note 6, at 
1445-47 (equating employee’s harm-avoidance burden with duty to use formal channels of complaint); 
Murr, supra note 6, at 614 (identifying harm avoidance as either submitting to sexual harassment or 
reporting sexual harassment). 
43. See, e.g., Oleyar v. County of Durham, 336 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519-20 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (finding
that employer satisfied second prong of affirmative defense because plaintiff “never filed a formal 
grievance alleging discrimination”); Dennis v. Nevada, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (D. Nev. 2003) 
(granting summary judgment based on plaintiff’s “complete failure to formally report the alleged 
harassment”); Beiner, Women’s Stories, supra note 6, at 139 (discussing courts’ focus on women’s 
failure to avail themselves promptly of employers’ official complaint procedures when harassed); 
Lawton, supra note 6, at 255-60 (noting courts’ emphasis on harassment victims’ failure to utilize 
employers’ formal reporting channels).  
44. See Beiner, Women’s Stories, supra note 6, at 139 (stating that women’s active response of
avoiding harasser and harassment are instead seen as “‘doing nothing’ by the courts”). 
45. Beiner has also discussed the courts’ failure to reflect the reality of sexual harassment and its
operation in the workplace in considering other aspects of the affirmative defense. Id. at 117. 
46. Id. at 117-18. 
47. See Abrams, supra note 36, at 112-13 (defining agency as “the capacity for self-definition or
self-direction, a capacity that has often been comprehended within the term ‘autonomy’ in classical 
liberal analysis”). 
48. See Abrams, supra note 36, at 120 (listing strategies employed by harassed employees “to
protect themselves and their jobs”); Chamallas, supra note 13, at 375 (underscoring parallel arguments 
between questioning judgment of women who do not leave abusive intimate relationship and women 
employees who do not report sexual harassment at work); Louise F. Fitzgerald, Who Says? Legal and 
Psychological Constructions of Women’s Resistance to Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 36, at 94, 99-101 (observing that women resist unwelcome sexual 
harassment in many ways even if “[t]he response the law apparently finds most compelling is the one 
that woman [sic] make least often”). 
49. Abrams, supra note 36, at 113-14. 
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sexual harassment, come into sharper focus.50 
Part I of this Article discusses the development of the affirmative defense to 
employer liability for supervisor sexual harassment. Part II of this Article relates 
a brief fictional story about Lena, a female employee, who is a composite of 
many real women employees. Lena alleges that her supervisor, Dave, has 
sexually harassed her. This story contextualizes this Article’s discussion of the 
affirmative defense to supervisor sexual harassment. Part III explores the 
concepts of “harm” and “avoidance of harm” within the liability framework for 
supervisor sexual harassment under Title VII law and social science research. 
Part IV discusses the current doctrine regarding employer liability and its 
relation to employee harm avoidance. Part V argues that, based on Title VII’s 
animating principle of harm avoidance as well as the realities of harm avoidance 
actions taken by women employees, courts, lawyers, employees, employers, and 
scholars need to reconceptualize the import and power of the “avoid harm 
otherwise” component of the affirmative defense.  
I. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In 1998, the Supreme Court articulated a specific liability scheme for sexual 
harassment committed by a supervisor (hereinafter described as “supervisor 
sexual harassment”). This articulation provided guiding principles for such 
liability determinations and created an affirmative defense based on those 
principles. The Court articulated this framework in two companion cases, 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth51 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.52 
Specifically, the proof framework required that once a court determined that a 
supervisor sexually harassed an employee, the next inquiry was whether liability 
for the sexual harassment could be imputed to the employer.53 The Court 
determined that employers were to be held vicariously liable for supervisor 
sexual harassment.54 If the supervisor sexual harassment resulted in a tangible 
employment action,55 such as a firing or a demotion, the employer would be 
50. Id. at 114; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998) (recognizing that
supervisor draws on his superior position, making it difficult for subordinate employee to deal with 
harassment); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998) (acknowledging power 
differential and antisubordination theory when supervisor sexually harasses subordinate); Vicki 
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1748-55 (1998) (discussing sexual 
harassment as part of larger problem that workplace is systematically gender biased and produces 
disadvantages for women).  
51. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
52. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
53. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
54. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; accord Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 1998)
(stating that employer is presumed to be absolutely liable for supervisory sexual harassment, as 
opposed to coworker harassment, for which employer will only be liable for negligence); McPherson v. 
City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 439 (7th Cir. 2004) (“When a supervisor is the harasser, the employer 
is strictly liable for his or her conduct, subject to any affirmative defenses that may preclude its 
liability.”).  
55. See supra note 4 for Faragher and Ellerth’s definition of a tangible employment action. 
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automatically liable without any affirmative defense to such liability.56 On the 
other hand, if the sexual harassment created a hostile work environment without 
any tangible employment action, the employer would be vicariously liable 
subject to a two-part affirmative defense.57 Under the defense, to be free of 
liability, the employer has to prove successfully both parts of the test.58 Under 
the first part, the employer must prove “that the employer exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior” 
(hereinafter described as the “employer-focused prong”).59 Under the second 
part, the employer must prove “that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed 
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise” (hereinafter described as the “employee-
focused prong”).60  
In crafting the entire affirmative defense, the Supreme Court relied on a 
number of principles, including harm avoidance, common law agency, 
respondeat superior, conciliation, and notice.61 Below, this section focuses on the 
harm avoidance doctrine because it is the specific principle that the Court 
articulated as the basis for the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the 
employee-focused prong. 
The Court relied on the avoidable consequences doctrine in creating the 
affirmative defense in general and the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the 
employee-focused prong of the affirmative defense in particular.62 The avoidable 
consequences doctrine focuses on the mitigation of injuries and damages.63 One 
56. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
57. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
58. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
59. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
60. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
61. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 (developing affirmative defense based on other principles because
“aided in the agency relation[ship]” standard had not developed enough to help clarify further 
whether automatic liability should attach in supervisor hostile environment sexual harassment cases). 
Please note that this Article does not discuss the common law agency and respondeat superior 
principles at length because, in the end, the Court crafted the “avoid harm otherwise” requirement 
based on harm avoidance principles. 
62. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07. The court in Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1999),
stated that:  
The “failure to avail” standard is not intended to punish the plaintiff merely for being 
dilatory. Rather, it “reflects an . . . obvious policy imported from the general theory of 
damages,” namely, that the victim has a duty to mitigate her damages. “If the victim could 
have avoided harm, no liability should be found against the employer who had taken 
reasonable care, and . . . no award against a liable employer should reward a plaintiff for 
what her own efforts could have avoided.”  
Greene, 164 F.3d at 674 (first omission in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
807); see also Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 934-35 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that second prong 
incorporates avoidable consequences doctrine); Murr, supra note 6, at 609-12 (discussing Supreme 
Court’s reliance on avoidable consequences doctrine in crafting employee-focused prong). 
63. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (basing its holding on “the principle of vicarious liability for
harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII’s equally basic policies of 
encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees”); Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
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of Title VII’s primary objectives, according to the Court, is to prevent harm.64 
Accordingly, the harm avoidance rationale is a basis for both the employer- and 
employee-focused prongs of the affirmative defense. Specifically, the Court 
found that the employer-focused prong, which requires the employer to 
“exercise[] reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior,”65 explicitly underscored the employer’s obligation to 
prevent violations of the statute, identified as acts of sexual harassment, and 
correct the behavior if violations occur.66 The Court indicated that reasonable 
prevention would include an employer having an antiharassment policy and 
effective, reasonable procedures by which an employee subjected to sexual 
harassment could report and resolve the behavior.67 Reasonable corrective 
efforts would include an employer taking prompt remedial action to deal with 
the sexual harassment.68 
The Court also stated that the employee-prong of the affirmative defense to 
liability and damages for supervisor sexual harassment was consistent with the 
policy rationale of harm avoidance by the employee.69 The defense only credits 
an employer who takes reasonable care to prevent and correct sexual harassment 
in the workplace if the employee did not fulfill her equally important 
“coordinate duty” to avoid or mitigate harm.70 As one commentator stated, “the 
Court’s simple pronouncements in [Faragher and Ellerth] require that employers 
be held liable . . . for harm that the victimized employee could not have avoided 
through reasonable care.”71 Accordingly, in establishing the affirmative defense, 
the Court stated that the employer should be permitted to show an affirmative 
defense to automatic liability that both showed that it “had exercised reasonable 
care to avoid harassment and to eliminate it when it might occur, and that the 
complaining employee had failed to act with like reasonable care to take 
advantage of the employer’s safeguards and otherwise to prevent harm that 
at 764 (declaring that Court is bound by precedent that seeks to promote Congress’s goal of 
“conciliation rather than litigation” in Title VII disputes); Marks, supra note 6, at 1439-40 (“[T]he 
Court sought “to accommodate” a comprehensive range of competing principles and policies: 
specifically, the panoply of agency principles counseling in favor of vicarious liability when supervisors 
abuse their power, versus policies of prevention and mitigation furthered by limiting liability when 
employers exercise forethought and employees fail to pursue reasonable harm-avoidance strategies.”). 
64. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764. 
65. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
66. Id. at 806 (stating that statutory policy provides incentives to prevent sexual harassment
through establishment of complaint procedures). 
67. Id. 
68. See id. at 807 (stating that necessary element of affirmative defense is “that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior”); cf. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (noting Title VII is designed to promote effective grievance mechanisms).  
69. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
70. Id. at 806; Marks, supra note 6, at 1419-20 & n.11 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806); see also 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (stating that defense is only applicable where employee failed in obligation to 
avoid harm); cf. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 128 (1935) (“[I]t 
seems more realistic to recognize that denial of recovery for avoidable injury is really a doctrine 
restricting the limits of liability for the reasons of social and economic policy . . . .”).  
71. Marks, supra note 6, at 1435. 
2007] “AVOIDING HARM OTHERWISE” 757 
could have been avoided.”72 As such, the entire defense focuses on not only the 
employer’s duties to prevent and correct sexual harassment but on an 
employee’s duty (to be proven by the employer) to avoid harm.73 
Regarding the employee-focused prong, the Court provided two ways in 
which the employee might meet her duty: either she can avail herself of the 
employer’s preventive or corrective opportunities, or she can avoid harm 
otherwise.74 In Faragher, the Court identified that a sexual harassment “victim 
has a duty ‘to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid 
or minimize the damages’ that result from violations of the statute.”75 This 
policy, the Court stated, was “imported from the general theory of damages.”76 
The Court grounded the employee-focused prong in tort law’s “avoidable 
consequences” doctrine, which governs mitigation of damages by plaintiffs after 
the harm has occurred.77 This doctrine is distinct from the doctrine of 
“contributory negligence,” which is a liability concept that discusses a plaintiff’s 
duty to take measures to stop the harm before it occurs.78  
By justifying the affirmative defense’s focus on the employee’s duty to avoid 
harm as relating to the avoidable consequence doctrine, as opposed to the 
contributory negligence doctrine, the Court dictates that employers focus on 
actions taken by employees after experiencing harm when invoking the 
affirmative defense to liability determinations in supervisor sexual harassment 
cases.79 If an employee’s “damages could reasonably have been mitigated[,] no 
72. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805. In addition, the Court stated that “a theory of vicarious liability for 
misuse of supervisory power would be at odds with the statutory policy if it failed to provide 
employers with some such incentive.” Id. at 806. 
73. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146 (2004) (reiterating that, in proving
affirmative defense to liability, defendant bears burden of proving that plaintiff could have reduced 
her loss or avoided harmful consequences). The Court clarified that a plaintiff may, but is not required 
to, make factual allegations showing her acts to avoid or mitigate harm in anticipation of the 
employer’s affirmative defense. Id. at 152. 
74. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07 (“If the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of the
employer’s preventive or remedial apparatus, she should not recover damages that could have been 
avoided if she had done so. If the victim could have avoided harm, no liability should be found against 
the employer who had taken reasonable care, and if damages could reasonably have been mitigated no 
award against a liable employer should reward a plaintiff for what her own efforts could have 
avoided.”). 
75. Id. at 806 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 n.15 (1982)); accord Holly D.
v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1178 (9th Cir. 2003) (confirming that employee-focused prong of
employer’s affirmative defense addresses victim’s duty to avoid or minimize her damages). 
76. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806. 
77. Id. (stating general damages theory that victim must use reasonable means to avoid or
minimize damages); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (“Title VII borrows 
from tort law the avoidable consequences doctrine . . . and the considerations which animate that 
doctrine would also support the limitation of employer liability in certain circumstances.”); Murr, 
supra note 6, at 535 (stating that second prong of affirmative defense is based on avoidable 
consequences doctrine and associated with mitigation of damages). 
78. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 128-29 (contrasting doctrine of avoidable consequences with
doctrine of contributory negligence and stating that where plaintiff is negligent prior to completion of 
defendant’s wrongdoing, under doctrine of contributory negligence, plaintiff is barred from any relief).  
79. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (citing Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231 n.15; see also Holly D., 339
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award against a liable employer should reward a plaintiff for what her own 
efforts could have avoided.”80 As stated by one commentator: 
Under [the avoidable consequences] doctrine, the employer’s task is 
one of causal apportionment. To fully avoid liability, the employer 
must prove that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avoid all harm; 
otherwise, the doctrine of avoidable consequences allows imposition of 
liability, subject only to “mitigation” of damages that the plaintiff 
unreasonably failed to avoid.81  
If the employee “could have avoided suffering harm by taking some action that a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would likely take,” and if she does 
not take that action, then the employer should not be liable.82 Another 
commentator underscored the importance of analyzing the reasonableness of the 
harm avoidance actions taken in determining liability.83 For instance, if the 
plaintiff submitted to the sexual harassment rather than reporting it because she 
reasonably calculated that she would lessen her job-related harm of possible 
retaliation and economic harm of lost wages if fired, then the plaintiff’s harm 
avoidance actions should be evaluated under a reasonableness standard.84 
In crafting the affirmative defense, the Supreme Court rejected Justice 
Thomas’s concerns raised in his dissenting opinion in Ellerth, that “‘employers 
will be liable notwithstanding the affirmative defense, even though they acted 
reasonably, so long as the plaintiff in question fulfilled her duty of reasonable 
F.3d at 1178 (observing that second prong is based on damages theory that victim has duty to avoid or
mitigate damages through reasonable means (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806)). 
It should be noted that the Court is frequently, but not always, consistent in its recitation of the 
avoidable consequences doctrine. In Faragher, the Court at one point seemingly confuses the 
avoidable consequences doctrine with the contributory negligence doctrine. 524 U.S. at 807. 
Specifically, the Court stated that if the employee unreasonably failed to avoid the sexual harassment, 
liability is barred against the employer. Id. Although the Court made this statement within its broader 
discussion of the avoidable consequences doctrine, this reasoning seems grounded in contributory 
negligence doctrine. As one commentator noted, contributory negligence is “a largely rejected defense 
from antiquated tort law.” Marks, supra note 6, at 1445. This rejection of the defense occurred because 
“[t]he defense ‘departed seriously from ideals of accountability and deterrence because it completely 
relieved the defendant from liability even if he was by far the most negligent actor.’” Id. at 1445 n.248 
(quoting DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 494 (2000)). Accordingly, the contributory negligence 
defense has been rejected and “largely replaced with various systems of ‘comparative fault’ that 
generally attempt to apportion accountability based on the relative fault of the parties.” Id. In light of 
the disfavor of contributory negligence and the fact that the Court only made one isolated reference to 
the doctrine, it cannot be given much significance here. Rather, because the Court discussed at length 
the avoidable consequences doctrine, it appears to be the animating principle of the “avoid harm 
otherwise” component. 
80. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
81. Marks, supra note 6, at 1420 (footnote omitted). 
82. Jones v. District of Columbia, 346 F. Supp. 2d 25, 50 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
429 F.3d 276 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
83. See Murr, supra note 6, at 613-15 (recognizing that economic and job-related harms can result 
from sexual harassment and that calculation of avoiding harm by either submitting to sexual 
harassment or reporting sexual harassment has to be evaluated based on which action more 
reasonably would be effective at avoiding harm). 
84. Id. at 614-15. 
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care to avoid harm.’”85 Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s (“EEOC”) Enforcement Guidance illustrates the harm-avoidance 
rationale by stating that the employer will not successfully establish the 
affirmative defense if the employee made efforts other than utilizing the 
complaint process in order to avoid harm.86 Some examples provided by the 
EEOC include “a prompt complaint by the employee to the EEOC or state fair 
employment practices agency while the harassment is ongoing”87 or “a staffing 
firm worker who is harassed at the client’s workplace might report the 
harassment either to the staffing firm or to the client, reasonably expecting that 
either would act to correct the problem.”88 Of course, the EEOC Guidance does 
not purport to provide exhaustive examples of harm avoidance actions by 
employees or to address directly many of the harms and avoidance mechanisms 
this Article seeks to identify.89 Nonetheless, the EEOC Guidance is helpful in 
illustrating that harm avoidance mechanisms other than filing a grievance with 
the employer should be recognized in liability determinations under the 
affirmative defense. 
One scholar provides the following helpful analogy from the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts in order to explain the avoidable consequences doctrine and 
what types of harm and harm avoidance mechanisms are included in the analysis: 
In the first scenario, a tort victim suffers bodily injury but then fails to 
protect her own interests by stubbornly refusing to promptly seek 
treatment for those injuries. Under such circumstances, the victim may 
recover only for the harm proximately caused by the tortfeasor and not 
the aggravation of the initial injuries attributable to her stubborn and 
thus unreasonable failure to obtain prompt medical treatment. . . . Her 
choice to pursue the second alternative [delaying medical treatment] is 
unreasonable in the absence of any explanation other than sheer 
stubbornness. 
 In a second scenario . . . the same tort victim suffers the same bodily 
injury but is faced with additional risks relevant to her decision-making 
process. Although the victim in this second scenario realizes that her 
injury likely requires prompt expert treatment, seeking such treatment 
would require traveling ten miles over treacherous ice-covered roads. 
Due to the hazards of travel, the victim waits until the following day to 
go to the nearest physician. Because of the delay, the victim suffers 
further injury. Under circumstances such as these where the victim is 
choosing between two potentially costly or harmful alternatives, harm-
avoidance principles dictate that a trier of fact may reasonably 
85. Marks, supra note 6, at 1440 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 773
(1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
86. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER 
LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS § V.D.2 (1999), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment/html#vd. [hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE]. 
87. Id. (citing Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
88. Id. (explaining that both staffing firm and client may be responsible for taking corrective
action). 
89. See id. (beginning its list of illustrations with “[f]or example”). 
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conclude that the victim did not act unreasonably in delaying 
professional treatment. If the trier of fact so concludes, the victim can 
recover for the additional damages caused by the delay in seeking 
treatment. What makes this second scenario different from the first are 
the circumstances facing the victim—two competing alternatives each 
with a corresponding potential harm—when she is deciding upon the 
appropriate course of action. The potentially different outcome in the 
second scenario is driven by a cost-benefit analysis of the two 
competing alternatives.90  
In the second example provided above, the victim’s harms include her 
original bodily injury, the exacerbation of her original bodily injury due to her 
delayed treatment, and the potential additional harm from a car accident due to 
the icy conditions. The harm avoidance mechanisms in the second example 
include expert treatment for the bodily injury, which would mitigate the original 
injury and avoid the harm of exacerbation to that injury, and not driving on the 
treacherous ice-covered roads. Accordingly, here the harm avoidance analysis is 
a cost-benefit analysis of the multiple harms which would be avoided or 
exacerbated by the potential harm avoidance actions. As seen in this example, 
seeking expert treatment can reduce or eliminate the bodily injuries but may 
create a new injury. Therefore, whether this action must or should be taken for 
harm avoidance requires a balancing of the harms and how those harms might be 
impacted by the actions. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, harm 
avoidance analyses require an understanding that certain actions may not only 
decrease specific harms but can also increase other harms.91 As a result, a 
determination of whether an individual avoided harm needs to consider the cost-
benefit analysis involved in the individual’s decision making as to her course of 
action to avoid harm.92 To make this determination, the fact finder must consider 
all harms, all harm avoidance mechanisms, and all of the varying and multiple 
effects on harms that will result or do result from the harm avoidance actions. It 
is this complex analysis that has been missing and that needs to be introduced 
into the liability determinations. 
Accordingly, applying the avoidable consequences doctrine to sexual 
harassment cases, a court must consider the employee’s broad range of harms 
resulting from the sexual harassment and the employee’s attempts and successes 
at avoiding the harm. In determining whether an employee avoided harm 
otherwise, a court must consider the cost and benefit of each harm-avoidance 
action available to the employee with regard to its impact on all harms from 
sexual harassment. In order to provide context to the harm avoidance analysis, 
the next section provides a brief discussion of a woman employee’s experience 
with sexual harassment, the harms to which she is subjected, and the harm 
avoidance actions she takes. 
90. Murr, supra note 6, at 613-14 (footnotes omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 918 cmt. a, illus. 1, 10 (1979)). 
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c. 
92. Murr, supra note 6, at 613-14. 
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II. LENA’S STORY
Lena is a computer specialist at a company where she has worked for about 
five years. Lena is twenty-four years old. Lena started working at the company as 
an administrative assistant. At the same time, she enrolled in classes to learn 
about computer software and systems. Once completing several classes, she 
applied, and was selected, for the position of computer specialist about eighteen 
months ago. Lena is a bit of a loner at work; she is very intelligent, energetic, 
slightly high strung, incredibly hardworking, and insistent on doing an excellent 
job. Lena and her husband have two young children. After the birth of each of 
her children, Lena returned to work after only two weeks time because of her 
love for her job and the sense of competence and satisfaction that she derived 
from work. She often volunteers for and works overtime and weekends. Lena is 
known by the other company employees as the person who will do whatever it 
takes to get the job done. 
Since Lena began as a computer specialist, Dave, the head of the computer 
services department, has served as her direct supervisor. Over the past year, 
Dave regularly has called Lena to his office for one-on-one meetings in which he 
closes the door, sits close to her, and touches her. Initially, he brushed his hands 
slightly against her thigh, but over the past few months or so, he has begun 
rubbing his hand over her thigh, arm, and back. 
Lena has begun making excuses to Dave for why they should meet in her 
open cubicle rather than in his closed office. When Dave has touched Lena 
inappropriately, she has always responded by moving her body away from him—
or standing up to end the meeting with excuses of needing to attend to other 
necessary work. She also instant-messaged Victor, another computer specialist 
who serves as the acting director of the department when Dave is on leave, about 
Dave’s behavior. Victor has been kind to Lena since she joined the company. In 
her instant message, Lena tried hard to minimize her alarm at Dave’s actions. 
Victor responded with a joke about Dave’s desperation for finding a date. Lena 
felt humiliated and decided to not provide any more information to Victor. 
Recently, Lena has started talking to her best friend, Karen, about Dave’s 
actions. Lena asked Karen whether it is possible that Lena is mistaking Dave’s 
actions and whether he could be a touchy person or unaware of what he is doing. 
Lena has also started to tell Karen that the joy she used to feel when going to 
work is no longer there. Instead Lena feels a lot of dread. She no longer 
volunteers for, and instead turns down, overtime work opportunities. She has 
started calling in sick—something she never did in the past unless she absolutely 
had no other choice. She also has started to have difficulty sleeping at night and 
has no interest in eating. She has noticed that she feels even more on edge than 
she ever had in the past. 
As time passes, Lena is upset with the emotional toll and the toll on her 
work caused by the turmoil at work. She talks to Karen, who says that it sounds 
like Dave is sexually harassing Lena. Karen asks Lena whether the company has 
a sexual harassment policy and Lena says it does. Lena investigates the policy 
and learns she can complain to the director of human resources, her supervisor, 
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and her supervisor’s supervisor. Lena does not want to complain to an official at 
the company. For one thing, she worries that Karen is wrong and Dave’s conduct 
is not sexual harassment. After all, Victor did not seem alarmed by it. Also, Lena 
is worried that her coworkers will not back her up and will make fun of her, as 
Victor had. And, she is concerned about how she will be able to do her job after 
Dave and the others learn that she complained about him. She fears they might 
not ever speak to her again. Lena does not think that the risk of losing her job is 
worth reporting the behavior. 
III. EMPLOYEES’ HARMS FROM SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THEIR HARM 
AVOIDANCE MECHANISMS 
Using Lena’s story, this Part will explore all of the harms suffered by 
employees who experience sexual harassment and all harm avoidance actions 
employees take in order to analyze and make liability determinations. If Lena 
did bring suit, the court most likely would ask the parties to address the question 
of employer liability early on in the litigation. As stated above, the affirmative 
defense requires the employer to prove both (a) “that the employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing 
behavior” and (b) “that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”93 
In determining liability and addressing the employee-focused prong, this 
Article argues that the employer should need to identify Lena’s harms from the 
sexual harassment, Lena’s responses to the various harms, and whether and how 
those responses might have assisted in her avoidance of harm or mitigation of 
damages. All of these factors should be relevant to a determination of whether 
Lena avoided harm as required under the affirmative defense to sexual 
harassment liability. 
A. Harms from Sexual Harassment
Despite its underutilization, the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the
affirmative defense is well suited to unifying the rationales of Title VII and the 
affirmative defense with the reality of women employees’ experiences with 
sexual harassment. The job-related, economic, and psychological harms are 
intertwined injuries resulting from sexual harassment and should be analyzed as 
such in liability determinations.94  Many sources, including the law, workplace 
studies, and social science studies, identify the multiple harms resulting from 
sexual harassment.95 Harm is more complex and varied than one discrete act of 
93. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (emphasis added); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (emphasis added). 
94. See Chamallas, supra note 13, at 384-85 (discussing reality that women employees suffer
economic and psychological harms as job-related injuries resulting from sexual harassment). 
95. See Part III.A.1 for a discussion of sexual harassment harms identified in the law and Part
III.A.2 for a discussion of sexual harassment harms identified in workplace and social science studies.
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discrimination—such as a termination based on one’s sex. Rather, harm includes 
all of the multiple injuries that result from the discrimination in addition to the 
discrimination itself. 
1. Legal Support for Identifying a Broad Range of Harms
Under Title VII, harm has had a distinct meaning that is more extensive 
than the discriminatory act. For instance, Title VII, as originally enacted, makes 
illegal and remedies harm that results from the discrimination (for instance, 
being sexually harassed); tangible employment harm, such as being fired, not 
hired, and demoted; and intangible employment-related harm, such as the 
altering of an employee’s terms and conditions of employment.96 
In addition, a broad notion of harm in sexual harassment cases is consistent 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1991,97 which amended Title VII.98 The Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 recognizes other forms of harm resulting from actionable 
discrimination under Title VII, such as emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, 
mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life.99 As explained in the legislative 
history of the Act, many harms of discrimination were identified as compensable 
harms: “injury to their careers, to their mental and emotional health, and to their 
self-respect and dignity.”100  
The Supreme Court’s own definition of “sexual harassment” indicates that 
the harm from sexual harassment is broader than simply the acts of harassment. 
For example, the Court has held that for sexually harassing behavior to be 
legally cognizable it has to be so severe or pervasive as “‘to alter the conditions 
of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”101 
Under Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,102 the employee herself has to feel that the 
harassment is severe or pervasive, and the harassment has to be severe or 
pervasive to the reasonable person.103 Thus, an employee’s perception of the 
sexual harassment is included in the calculation of what constitutes sexual 
harassment. Accordingly, if an employee takes actions that prevent unwanted 
sexual touching, for instance, from causing her psychological injury, the 
employee’s own actions may prevent the abusive conduct from becoming 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to her.104 From this calculation we understand 
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
97. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
98. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. vii, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3). 
100. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 64-65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 602-03. As one 
commentator has noted, despite the recognition of both economic and psychological harms under Title 
VII, courts have tended to prioritize the economic harms, such as job-related harms, over 
psychological ones, creating unnecessarily a hierarchy of harms. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 386. 
101. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
102. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
103. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. 
104. See id. at 21-22 (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or 
764 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
 
that the harms of sexual harassment include the psychological, emotional, and 
physical responses to sexual harassment that affect whether the employee views 
her work environment as abusive. It is important to note, however, that the 
Supreme Court in Harris made clear that severe psychological injury is not 
required for an employee to feel that the harassment is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive.105 Accordingly, less severe forms of psychological injury also qualify 
as “harms” from sexual harassment.106 
Even the affirmative defense itself demonstrates that the concept of harm 
begins with, but does not end with, the act of sexual harassment. Whereas the 
employer is required to prevent and correct “any sexually harassing behavior” to 
avoid liability, the employer needs to show that the employee unreasonably 
failed to avoid “harm”—not simply the sexual harassment.107 To do so, she may 
use the employer-provided mechanisms for addressing sexual harassment, or she 
can avoid harm otherwise. Accordingly, the employer must show that the 
employee failed to mitigate her cognizable injuries resulting from the sexual 
harassment. 
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,108 the Court described the meaning of 
harm as those damages resulting from sexual harassment and that need to be 
avoided or mitigated in order to “avoid harm” under the affirmative defense.109 
Specifically, the Court stated that if the plaintiff unreasonably failed to use the 
employer’s complaint and grievance mechanisms, the employee should not 
recover for any damages that could have been avoided by using the 
abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the 
environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim’s 
employment, and there is no Title VII violation.”).  
105. See id. at 22 (“So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived,
as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.” (citation omitted)). 
106. It is important to note that tangible psychological harm or injury is not required for a hostile 
work environment to violate Title VII. Id. at 22; see also Marks, supra note 6, at 1433 n.190 (discussing 
“gradual-onset” cases which “contemplate[] a gradual building of incidents that eventually crosses 
Title VII’s abuse threshold”). Discussing only the harm of sexual harassment, Marks states that only if 
plaintiff’s dilatory behavior in reporting contributes to the sexual harassment should it impact 
recovery. See id. at 1434-35 (“Because of this purportedly unreasonable delay, the court decided, as a 
matter of law, that the plaintiff could recover nothing for the rape, even though the plaintiff’s delay—
which, of course, came after the sudden rape—bore absolutely no causal connect to the occurrence of 
the rape.” (footnote omitted)). Marks therefore notes that the “[h]arm-avoidance analysis under 
Ellerth and Faragher thus contemplates the possible avoidance of a truly imprecise and intangible type 
of legal harm.” Id. at 1448. Specifically, it is imprecise because it is difficult to distinguish between 
nonactionable and actionable misconduct that does not rest on “actual harm” but legal harm. Id. at 
1447-48. 
107. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (emphasis added). 
108. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
109. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07 (stating that requiring employer to show that “the employee
has failed in a coordinate duty to avoid or mitigate harm reflects an equally obvious policy imported 
from the general theory of damages, that a victim has a duty ‘to use such means as are reasonable 
under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages’” (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 
U.S. 219, 231 n.15 (1982)).  
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mechanisms.110 Additionally, if the employer would be held liable, no damages 
should be awarded for harm that could have been mitigated but was not.111 A 
commentator succinctly stated that in making the above pronouncements, the 
Court was incorporating the “harm-avoidance concept,” which does not look at 
“whether, or to what extent, a negligent plaintiff is blameworthy and thus 
undeserving of compensation; instead, the fact finder tries to determine how 
much harm the plaintiff should have avoided.”112 Much of the law, therefore, has 
defined harm broadly—from employment harms to economic harms to 
psychological harms. 
2. Harms Documented in Workplace and Social Science Studies
A broad range of injuries resulting from sexual harassment are documented 
in workplace and other social science studies as well.113 The 1995 MSPB 
workplace study estimated the following job-related harms from sexual 
harassment over a two year period. First, the study documented $4.4 million in 
lost wages due to the taking of leave without pay.114 In addition, the study 
concluded that 973,000 hours of annual leave were taken as a result of sexual 
harassment.115 In addition, employees subjected to sexual harassment may have 
resigned, been terminated, or faced reassignment as a result of the sexual 
harassment.116 And twenty-one percent of the workers subjected to sexual 
harassment in the federal workplace study reported that they suffered a decline 
in productivity as a result of the sexual harassment.117 
The MSPB’s 1995 federal workplace study also documented economic, 
emotional, psychological, and physical harms as a result of sexual harassment. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 807. 
112. Marks, supra note 6, at 1445-46 (emphasis omitted) (citing DOBBS, supra note 79, at 510-11). 
113. See, e.g., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 13-27
(evaluating definition of sexual harassment and its impact on federal employees); Fitzgerald et al., 
supra note 29, at 117-38 (examining internal and external ways that women respond to sexual 
harassment). Well before the Supreme Court’s articulation of the affirmative defense to employer 
liability for supervisor sexual harassment, social psychologists were researching responses to sexual 
harassment as a way of informing the discourse about whether sexual harassment was “unwelcome.” 
See generally Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 130-32 (discussing how courts have construed person’s 
failure to speak up as welcoming advances or comments, and person who “go[es] along” with situation 
as consenting to sexual behavior). See, for example, BEINER, supra note 39, at 62-96, for a more in-
depth discussion of the social science research regarding sexual harassment, including responses to 
sexual harassment and their impact on the law, and Krieger, supra note 6, at 177-98, for a discussion of 
how social science research on responses to sexual harassment should inform the “reasonableness” of 
an employee’s failure to use an employer’s preventive and corrective mechanisms under the 
affirmative defense. In addition, Professor Beiner discusses the “great promise” social science research 
holds for clarifying the legal doctrine in sexual harassment cases even though methodological 
difficulties and the preliminary and incomplete nature of some of the research results in an imperfect 
fit between law and social science research. BEINER, supra note 39, at 2-14.  
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Specifically, the study reported that “[f]or employees who experience it, sexual 
harassment takes its toll in the form of mental and emotional stress and even loss 
of income, if victims leave their jobs or take leave without pay as a result of their 
experiences.”118 One survey respondent stated: “‘[m]y stomach would get sick 
when I’d hear his chair creak—because I knew he’d be coming back to my desk. 
I actually even had nightmares involving this man . . . .’”119 Another survey 
respondent recounted “‘[h]e has repeatedly, since I have worked there, said 
disgusting and vulgar things about women. I have gone home or stayed home 
many times so I wouldn’t have to face him or hear the remarks he would make 
throughout the day.’”120 And another survey respondent reported “‘I can 
perform under normal pressure very well, but added mental stress has reduced 
my productivity. I had to take time to report, talk about it, seek medical and 
mental assistance.’”121 Yet another stated: 
“I was very upset by his request for a sexual favor. My superior 
performance rating was lowered by him to fully acceptable. I did not 
want to hurt his career, but it hurt mine. I felt I must resign. After six 
months on unemployment, which was very degrading, I returned to 
work with the government, having to take a downgrade. This 
experience has left me very bitter and down on myself and my 
abilities.”122 
Even though a low percentage of victims of sexual harassment received medical 
or emotional help, many more reported that they would have found such help 
beneficial.123 
Similarly, social science research offers identified categories of harm 
resulting from sexual harassment beyond the act of discrimination itself. Dr. 
Louise Fitzgerald and her colleagues (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
Fitzgerald) defines sexual harassment as a psychological stress where the person 
subjected to the sexual harassment is harmed because she views her relationship 
with her environment as “taxing or exceeding [her] resources” and endangering 
her well-being.124 Fitzgerald has identified four categories of harm resulting from 
118. Id. at 23. Similarly, Martha Chamallas has demonstrated that economic and psychological
harms are interrelated injuries. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 384-85. See infra notes 151-54 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of physical and psychological harms associated with sexual 
harassment. 
119. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 23 (omission in
original). 
120. Id. at 24. 
121. Id. at 25. 
122. Id. at 27. 
123. See id. at 26 tbl.6 (showing that whereas only three percent of victims of sexual harassment
reported receiving medical or emotional help, seven percent reported that such help would have been 
beneficial). 
124. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 123-24 (quoting RICHARD S. LAZARUS & SUSAN 
FOLKMAN, STRESS, APPRAISAL, & COPING 21 (1984)) (emphasizing perception of woman who is 
sexually harassed in definition of sexual harassment); see also LAZARUS & FOLKMAN, supra, at 21 
(recognizing that definition of stress accounts for relationship between person and environment); 
Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 697 (noting sexual harassment is stressful situation that can exceed 
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sexual harassment. First, her research identifies a multitude of job-related harms, 
including decreased satisfaction with coworkers and supervision, work 
withdrawal or absenteeism, increased willingness to change jobs, more time 
spent thinking about leaving the job, and increased job stress.125 Similar findings 
have been made by other social psychologists as well.126 Second, Dr. Fitzgerald’s 
research documents severe psychological harms, such as posttraumatic stress 
disorder (“PTSD”), a psychological disorder in which the person experiences a 
decrease in life satisfaction, a worsening of emotional condition, and a decrease 
in self-esteem.127 Third, she has identified numerous emotional harms, including 
increased anger, fear, depression, anxiety, loss of self-esteem, and feelings of 
alienation.128 Finally, Dr. Fitzgerald identified physical harms resulting from 
sexual harassment, such as gastrointestinal disturbances, jaw tightness, teeth 
grinding, nervousness, binge eating, headaches, inability to sleep, tiredness, 
nausea, loss of appetite, weight loss, and crying spells.129 
Others have identified similar harms, even identifying five categories of 
harm from sexual harassment: “emotional and physical reactions; changes in self-
perception; social, interpersonal relatedness; sexual effects; and career 
resources of harassed (citing GUTEK, supra note 36, at 46; AN UPDATE, supra note 36, at 11; IS IT A 
PROBLEM?, supra note 36, at 36; Peggy Crull, Stress Effects of Sexual Harassment on the Job: 
Implications for Counseling, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 539, 539-44 (1982); Nancy DiTomaso, 
Sexuality in the Workplace: Discrimination and Harassment, in THE SEXUALITY OF ORGANIZATION 71, 
71-90 (Jeff Hearn et al. eds., 1989); Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual
Harassment in Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152, 171 (1988); Barbara A.
Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed Organizations: Consequences of and Coping
with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 28, 32-35 (1993))).
125. Louise F. Fitzgerald & Alayne J. Ormerod, Breaking Silence: The Sexual Harassment of
Women in Academia and the Workplace, in PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN: A HANDBOOK OF ISSUES AND 
THEORIES 553, 573-74 (Florence L. Denmark & Michele A. Paludi eds., 1993); cf. Ellen I. Shupe et al., 
The Incidence and Outcomes of Sexual Harassment Among Hispanic and Non-Hispanic White Women: 
A Comparison Across Levels of Cultural Affiliation, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 298, 305 (2002) (showing 
that Hispanic women least associated with U.S. culture revealed greater dissatisfaction with work and 
coworkers when sexually harassed than women more associated with culture). 
126. E.g., Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 688 (noting that those subjected to sexual harassment
“may experience career interruption, lower productivity, less job satisfaction, lower self-confidence, 
loss of motivation, deterioration of interpersonal relationships, and loss of commitment to work and 
employer” (citing GUTEK, supra note 36, at 2-3; AN UPDATE, supra note 36, at 11; IS IT A PROBLEM?, 
supra note 36, at 36; Crull, supra note 124, at 539; DiTomaso, supra note 124, at 78-88; Louise F. 
Fitzgerald et al., The Antecedents and Consequences of Sexual Harassment in Organizations: An 
Integrated Model, in JOB STRESS IN A CHANGING WORKFORCE: INVESTIGATING GENDER, DIVERSITY, 
AND FAMILY ISSUES 55 (Gwendolyn Puryear Keita & Joseph J. Hurrell, Jr. eds., 1994); Fitzgerald et 
al., supra note 124, at 170-71; Gutek & Koss, supra note 124, at 33)).  
127. Fitzgerald & Ormerod, supra note 125, at 573-74 (noting enormous psychological costs
associated with sexual harassment); cf. Shupe et al., supra note 125, at 306 (observing that sexual 
harassment was linked with decreased life satisfaction and increased psychological distress for 
Hispanic women who participated in study). 
128. Fitzgerald & Ormerod, supra note 125, at 573-74. 
129. See id. (citing GUTEK, supra note 36, at 2-3; Crull, supra note 124, at 539) (listing potential
physical harms from sexual harassment); see also Shupe et al., supra note 125, at 298 (finding higher 
rates of anxiety and depression in Hispanic women who were subjected to sexual harassment). 
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effects.”130 Clearly, there is overlap between these categories. As one scholar has 
noted, sexual harassment: 
affects not only career opportunities and job satisfaction but also has 
personal implications that go beyond the workplace. The impact on 
victims is somewhat difficult to study because it is multidimensional, 
including effects on physical health, mental health, and “work variables 
including attendance, morale, performance, and impact on career 
track.”131  
Another study also shows that people subjected to workplace sexual 
harassment suffer job-related harms and psychological and physical harms.132 
And in fact such harms are often interrelated.133 Sexual harassment may affect 
the interpersonal relationships in the workplace.134 Sexual harassment that 
involves ostracism of the target of the harassment may lead to additional 
intangible job harms, such as loss of mentorship, as well as “decreased learning 
and networking opportunities, which can lead to decreased work 
opportunities.”135 Many studies have shown that supervisor sexual harassment 
was strongly correlated to decreased job satisfaction as well.136 For instance, one 
study showed that supervisor sexual harassment correlated to women’s “lower 
levels of satisfaction with work, supervision, and promotion as well as with 
higher levels of role ambiguity, role conflict, and stress.”137 Another showed that 
sexual harassment of all levels of severity negatively impacted job satisfaction 
and work productivity.138  
Other studies corroborated Fitzgerald’s finding of multiple physical harms 
resulting from sexual harassment. These physical harms include “stomach and 
appetite problems, sleep disorders, headaches, and crying spells.”139 
130. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge, supra note 6, at 320-21 (citing Karen Maitland
Schilling & Ann Fuehrer, The Organizational Context of Sexual Harassment (1998), reprinted in 
MICHELE A. PALUDI & RICHARD B. BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT: A RESOURCE MANUAL 123, 129-30 (1991)). Researchers have labeled these effects of 
sexual harassment as “Sexual Harassment Trauma Syndrome.” Id. at 320 (citing PALUDI & 
BARICKMAN, supra, at 27, 29-30 tbl.2.1).  
131. BEINER, supra note 39, at 185 (quoting Gutek & Koss, supra note 124, at 30). 
132. Gutek & Koss, supra note 124, at 30. 
133. See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between
job-related, psychological, and physical harms. 
134. BEINER, supra note 39, at 186. 
135. Id. (citing Gutek & Koss, supra note 124, at 31-32). 
136. E.g., id. at 186-87 (noting that sexual harassment appears to have effect on job satisfaction
(citing David N. Laband & Bernard F. Lentz, The Effects of Sexual Harassment on Job Satisfaction, 
Earnings, and Turnover Among Female Lawyers, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 594, 599-600 (1998); 
Vicki J. Magley et al., The Impact of Sexual Harassment on Military Personnel: Is it the Same for Men 
and Women?, 11 MIL. PSYCHOL. 283, 297 (1999); Paula C. Morrow et al., Sexual Harassment Behaviors 
and Work Related Perceptions and Attitudes, 45 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 295, 303 (1994))). 
137. Id. at 187 (citing Morrow et al., supra note 136, at 303). 
138. Id. (citing Magley et al., supra note 136, at 297). 
139. BEINER, supra note 39, at 187; see also Bonnie S. Dansky & Dean G. Kilpatrick, Effects of
Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 152, 168 
(William O’Donohue ed., 1997) (cataloging health-related effects of sexual harassment). 
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Unfortunately, the research is limited as to all of the physical harms of sexual 
harassment.140  
Finally, studies have shown that there are many psychological effects of 
sexual harassment. Included in the psychological effects are “anger, fear, 
depression, anxiety, helplessness, and vulnerability.”141 In addition, there are 
many disorders resulting from workplace sexual harassment such as “‘[a]nxiety 
disorders including panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder; somatoform 
disorders, various forms of depression, and post traumatic stress disorder.’”142 
Medical research shows that persons who are sexually harassed by being 
physically or sexually assaulted may suffer from PTSD.143 PTSD is not a disorder 
specific to sexual harassment but rather results when one is subjected to “an 
extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that 
involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one’s 
physical integrity.”144 In addition, another large study showed that women who 
were subjected to supervisor sexual harassment were more likely to be diagnosed 
with psychiatric disorders such as major depressive disorder and PTSD.145 
Of course, the employment-related harms of sexual harassment are tied 
closely to the physical and psychological harms. One study found that: 
[W]omen who experienced high levels of harassment reported the
worst job-related and psychological outcomes; women who were not
sexually harassed reported the lowest negative outcomes. Women who
reported moderate levels of harassment likewise had significantly
worse outcomes than women who were not harassed. Even low levels
of harassment increased negative outcomes.146
Professor Chamallas’s work demonstrating that economic and psychological 
harms are job-related injuries is highly relevant to sexual harassment harms 
analysis.147 Chamallas argues that economic injury can lead to psychological 
harm.148 For instance, when an employer takes an adverse action against the 
employee, the employee may then suffer from corresponding stress over 
economic opportunities and job security; similarly, an employee’s psychological 
distress resulting from the sexual harassment can lead to economic harm because 
140. BEINER, supra note 39, at 187 (citing Dansky & Kilpatrick, supra note 139, at 164). 
141. Id. (citing Gutek & Koss, supra note 124, at 33). 
142. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jane Goodman-Delahunty & William E. Foote,
Compensation for Pain, Suffering, and Other Psychological Injuries: The Impact of Daubert on 
Employment Discrimination Claims, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 183, 188 (1995)). 
143. Id. at 158 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 424 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL]). If 
someone has suffered PTSD in the past, then less severe forms of sexual harassment can also trigger 
PTSD. Id.  
144. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, supra note 143, at 424. 
145. Dansky & Kilpatrick, supra note 139, at 166-67 figs.9-1 & 9-2. 
146. BEINER, supra note 39, at 188 (citing Kimberly T. Schneider et al., Job-Related and
Psychological Effects of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from Two 
Organizations, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 401, 412-13 (1997)). 
147. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 384-85. 
148. Id. at 384. 
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the employee may have difficulty in being as motivated or productive in the 
workplace.149 In fact, the Supreme Court opinion in Harris lends support to 
Chamallas’s argument. In Harris, the Court showed that psychological harm, 
even if not severe, is interconnected to economic harm when it noted that “[a] 
discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously 
affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from 
employees’ job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, 
or keep them from advancing in their careers.”150  
One study has indicated that there is a relation between the intensity of the 
sexual harassment and the resulting psychological and physical harms. 
Nevertheless, the data suggests that the employer’s taking of negative tangible 
job action, such as the termination or transferring of an employee, may result 
more from retaliation than from the sexual harassment itself.151 More research is 
needed in this area to help determine the linkage between sexual harassment, 
the reporting of sexual harassment, and the job-related and other harms.152 As 
seen from the MSPB study discussed earlier, there does appear to be a 
relationship between the sexual harassment and job-related harm apart from any 
retaliation. In that study, employees reported quite a bit of job-related harm that 
resulted from the sexual harassment itself and not from the reporting of the 
sexual harassment.153 For instance, eight percent of the employees subjected to 
sexual harassment reported using sick leave, eight percent reported using annual 
leave, one percent used leave without pay, two percent were reassigned or fired, 
two percent were transferred to a new job, and twenty-one percent reported a 
decline in productivity.154 
One thing that is clear, however, is that there are multiple forms of harm 
and that the harms, at times, are interconnected. In addition, the harms from 
sexual harassment that are documented in the social science research strongly 
comport with those harms recognized under Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.155  
149. Id. at 384-85. 
150. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). 
151. BEINER, supra note 39, at 164 (citing Matthew S. Hesson-McInnis & Louise F. Fitzgerald,
Sexual Harassment: A Preliminary Test of an Integrative Model, 27 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 877, 896 
(1997)). 
152. Id. at 164-65 (hypothesizing that different results regarding frequency of termination of
sexual harassment victims may be explained by whether victim filed formal complaint, as those who 
were sexually harassed and filed formal complaints were fired in much larger numbers than their 
counterparts who declined to file complaints (citing SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 26 tbl.6; Frances S. Coles, Forced to Quit: Sexual Harassment 
Complaints and Agency Response, 14 SEX ROLES 81, 89 (1986))). 
153. See supra notes 114-23 for a discussion of the harms resulting from sexual harassment as
documented by the MSPB study.  
154. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 26 tbl.6.
155. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (prohibiting discriminatory employment practices), and 
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (allowing compensatory damages for “emotional pain, suffering, mental 
anguish, [and] loss of enjoyment of life,” but limiting such damages). 
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3. Lena’s Harms
Returning to Lena’s situation, application of the expanded understanding of 
“harm” derived from the affirmative defense to employer liability for supervisor 
sexual harassment, Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, workplace studies, 
and social science research, facilitates identification of the numerous forms of 
harm suffered by Lena. She has endured a year of unwelcome, severe, and 
pervasive touching on various parts of her body. In addition to being sexually 
harassed and discriminated against, she has suffered various intangible job, 
economic, psychological, and emotional harms. As a result of Dave’s sexual 
harassment, Lena has suffered loss of enjoyment of her job. She now dreads 
what used to be her passion. She has withdrawn from work as a consequence of 
the sexual harassment, thus impacting her ability to gain overtime pay. She is 
also taking sick leave. She is feeling anxious, on edge, and stressed. She is 
suffering emotional pain and suffering in that she has difficulty sleeping, has a 
decreased appetite, and a loss of joy. She feels humiliated by Victor’s joking 
about Dave’s actions. Finally, she is worried that if she complains, she will be 
made fun of further, will be ostracized, and might even lose her job. 
B. Harm Avoidance
Having identified all of the harms from sexual harassment, the harm
avoidance actions in response to these harms must be identified. In fact, the acts 
taken to “avoid harm” from sexual harassment are more diverse than filing a 
formal complaint of sexual harassment. One workplace study summarized the 
reality, which is that “[t]he range of responses for a victim of sexually harassing 
behavior is probably as vast as the range of human behavior itself.”156 The law 
and social science research again assist the understanding of what harm 
avoidance mechanisms are relevant to a supervisor sexual harassment liability 
determination. 
1. Legal and Social Science Support for Identifying Harm Avoidance
Mechanisms
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s rationale for the employee-
focused prong of the affirmative defense specifically relied on the avoidable 
consequences doctrine.157 One of the avoidable consequences doctrine’s goals is 
“to discourage even persons against whom wrongs have been committed from 
passively suffering economic loss which could be averted by reasonable 
efforts.”158 Accordingly, the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the 
employee-focused prong is grounded in preventing and mitigating harm. It is not 
grounded in notice or conciliation rationales. Therefore, the analysis of the 
“avoid harm otherwise” component is not restricted to acts informing the 
156. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 29. 
157. See supra notes 62-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine. 
158. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 127. 
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employer of the sexual harassment or acts utilizing the employer’s processes for 
complaining about and resolving the sexual harassment.159 
Similarly, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 shows the 
importance of accounting for all employee harm avoidance mechanisms. 
Explaining the need for providing compensatory damages to victims of 
discrimination, the House Report stated that “[m]onetary damages simply raise 
the cost of an employer’s engaging in intentional discrimination, thereby 
providing employers with additional incentives to prevent intentional 
discrimination in the workplace before it happens.”160 The affirmative defense 
operates to decrease monetary damages if the employee fails to avoid all 
otherwise compensable harms. 
To understand how employees avoid the harms of sexual harassment, social 
psychology research and employer workplace surveys are again instructive.161 It 
is important to note that some of the early research is limited because it was 
based on persons who were not subjected to sexual harassment. As recent social 
psychology research has shown, such prior sexual harassment studies were 
methodologically flawed.162 Those studies reported what persons who had never 
experienced sexual harassment hypothesized would be their response to sexual 
harassment.163 These responses did not correspond to those of real victims of 
sexual harassment.164 In addition, the prior literature is limited because the 
studies tended to ask about “active” or “passive” responses only and did not 
request narrative descriptions of what the responses were.165 
Recent studies have created new typologies, discussed below, to identify 
and research more completely the multitude of responses of women who are 
sexually harassed.166 These typologies are modifications of the past incomplete 
ones, which inaccurately categorized responses into “active” and “passive” 
responses.167 Unfortunately, even the new typologies, though more inclusive in 
159. See infra Parts V.B-C for a discussion of the applicability of the notice and conciliation
rationales to the affirmative defense. 
160. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603.
161. See generally BEINER, supra note 39, at 82-83 (discussing social science literature regarding
women’s responses to sexual harassment); SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, 
supra note 12, at 26-45 (detailing employees’ reactions to sexual harassment); Fitzgerald et al., supra 
note 29, at 119-23 (reviewing surveys reporting victim responses to sexual harassment).  
162. E.g., Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 119 (describing earlier studies of harm avoidance as
useful “starting point” but discounting value of these studies because they “are not derived from the 
reactions of actual victims”). 
163. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge, supra note 6, at 292-93. 
164. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 119; see also Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge, 
supra note 6, at 291-94 (noting value of social science research in determining how harassment occurs 
in workplace and exploring legal standard despite various limitations regarding data). 
165. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 119. 
166. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 6, at 177-90 (surveying social science research regarding
externally focused and internally focused response mechanisms). 
167. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 118-19. Interestingly, social psychologists’ early research
on responses to sexual harassment was flawed in much the same way current legal discourse is flawed; 
early research was limited to studying only one response to sexual harassment—the filing of a formal 
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the responses being studied, do not identify how the responses impact all of the 
harms resulting from sexual harassment. Therefore both the recent and the older 
studies do not address fully the effectiveness of the various responses of harassed 
employees in avoiding the harm.168 As a result, the discussion below is a 
beginning of what will hopefully be a call for research on how all of the 
responses women employees take in response to sexual harassment affect the 
various harms resulting from the harassment. 
Although more research is needed in this area, as the following discussion 
indicates, current social science research does provide insight into employee 
harm avoidance actions.169 In a study conducted by Dr. Louise Fitzgerald and 
her colleagues regarding responses to sexual harassment, they identified various 
coping mechanisms used by those subjected to sexual harassment in order to 
avoid harm.170 Fitzgerald identified that “‘coping (represents) constantly 
changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific external and/or 
internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the 
person.’”171 These cognitive and behavioral responses by women are undertaken 
“to manage or alter the distressing situation itself (problem-focused coping)”172 
and “to regulate emotional reaction (emotion-focused coping).”173  
Based on the stress and coping literature, Dr. Fitzgerald’s research created a 
new typology that includes both the “problem-focused” and the “emotion-
focused” responses used by women subjected to sexual harassment.174 The 
“problem-focused” responses are externally focused responses that center on the 
complaint. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 690. Accordingly, Knapp, Fitzgerald, and others have 
created conceptual frameworks that permit the “full range of responses to [sexual harassment] to be 
identified.” Id.; see, e.g., Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 23-26 (discussing victims’ 
responses to sexual harassment, including not filing formal complaints; responding with mild 
retributions; responding nonassertively, such as ignoring, rationalizing, avoiding the harasser, job, or 
situation; and identifying cognitive strategies for responses, including internally and externally focused 
responses”). 
168. The research shows that while many of the strategies to avoid harm may be effective in
decreasing some forms of harm, the same strategies may actually increase other forms of harm. See 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 31 (noting that avoidance of 
harasser may improve situation by removing victim from harassment but, conversely, may lead to 
decrease in productivity); see also Krieger, supra note 6, at 190-92 (discussing effectiveness of 
employees’ avoidance strategies and risks of confrontational alternatives). The tension between these 
strategies and their effect on the harm resulting from sexual harassment is an invaluable part of the 
necessary discourse in this area. 
169. See, e.g., Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge, supra note 6, at 312-23 (discussing
harm avoidance responses to sexual harassment and effects of sexual harassment on reporting). 
170. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 127-28. Fitzgerald created this typology in response to case 
law finding that inaction or submission by women in response to sexual harassment indicated 
welcomeness to the harassing behavior, thus invalidating their claim of discrimination. Id. at 129-34. 
171. Id. at 126 (quoting LAZARUS & FOLKMAN, supra note 124, at 178). 
172. Id. at 127. 
173. Id. 
174. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 128. The responses to sexual harassment result from the
victim’s assessment of the degree of danger posed by the unwanted conduct and the opportunities 
available at the time. Id. at 129; see also Fitzgerald & Ormerod, supra note 125, at 572-73 (analyzing 
reasons for women’s responses, or lack of responses, to sexual harassment). 
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woman’s attempts to prevent future harassment.175 The “emotion-focused” 
responses include the various internally focused responses that look to the 
woman’s personal coping strategies.176 All of these responses demonstrate 
employees’ harm avoidance actions in response to sexual harassment.177 
2. Externally Focused Harm Avoidance Mechanisms
The external coping mechanisms, or those strategies utilized to solve, 
manage, or alter the distressing situation itself, include a wide range of responses 
extending beyond a formal complaint to the employer pursuant to a 
nonharassment policy. As repeatedly discussed in the social psychology 
literature, the filing of a formal complaint is the least likely external response 
taken by women subjected to sexual harassment.178 These findings are confirmed 
175. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120-21. 
176. Id. at 119-20. Fitzgerald cautions that the internally focused coping strategies have been
underresearched due to the excessive focus on externally focused coping strategies. Id. 
177. Fitzgerald notes that a particular response to sexual harassment cannot be judged for
appropriateness or effectiveness without consideration of the individual woman herself because each 
response is influenced by factors such as the woman’s cognitive evaluation of the situation’s ability to 
impact her well-being, her evaluation of realistic and available options, and personal and situational 
resources and constraints. Id. at 129; see also Krieger, supra note 6, at 181 (recognizing that social 
science research shows that women employ many “reasonable” responses to cope with sexual 
harassment in workplace, including internally focused actions and externally focused behaviors).  
178. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 121 (stating that seeking institutional relief, whether
by bringing formal complaint, filing charges, or taking some other institutionally prescribed steps, 
against harasser is least common response to sexual harassment and is used primarily when other 
responses have proved unsuccessful); Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 23-26 (stating 
that formal complaints are least likely response to sexual harassment based on Fitzgerald’s research 
and federal government studies of its workforce); Krieger, supra note 6, at 182-83 (describing various 
studies showing that between five to fifteen percent of employees seek organizational relief in 
response to sexual harassment); Schneider et al., supra note 146, at 408 tbl.2 (indicating that only 
13.3% of private sector sample victims filed complaint; only 6% of university sample victims filed a 
complaint; 35.7% of sample one victims discussed situation with a supervisor or union representative; 
and 17.4% of sample two victims discussed the situation with a supervisor or union representative); 
Shupe et al., supra note 125, at 304 (indicating that Hispanic women least associated with U.S. culture 
have lowest report rate for sexual harassment while Hispanic women moderately affiliated with U.S. 
culture have higher report rates, and non-Hispanic white women have even higher report rates); S. 
Arzu Wasti & Lilia M. Cortina, Coping in Context: Sociocultural Determinants of Responses to Sexual 
Harassment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 394, 402 (2002) (noting that even though Turkish, 
Hispanic American, and Anglo American working women all tended not to report or file complaint 
about being sexually harassed, Hispanic working class women were less likely than Anglo American 
working class women to report harassment). But see Janice D. Yoder & Patricia Aniakudo, The 
Responses of African American Women Firefighters to Gender Harassment at Work, 32 SEX ROLES 
125, 130 (1995) (stating that fifty-five percent of African American women firefighters who were 
participants in study filed some sort of complaint); cf. Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ 
Rights Consciousness and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 83, 
87 (2005) (interpreting Yoder and Aniakudo study to show that “resistance to sexual harassment is 
shaped by specific organizational settings characterized by particular power arrangements”). 
Given the social science research and the current case law’s limiting of liability under the 
affirmative defense rubric, one set of scholars posits that the result is a “perverse incentive for 
employers” who seek to avoid liability to “exercise just enough reasonable care to satisfy a court, but 
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in the 1995 MSPB federal workplace study which reported that only twelve 
percent of workers who were subjected to unwanted sexual harassment reported 
the sexual harassment to a supervisor or other official.179 When examining the 
same response by gender, sixteen percent of the male workers and thirteen 
percent of the female workers reported the sexual harassment to a supervisor or 
other official.180 In the same federal workplace study, only six percent of the 
victims of sexual harassment actually made a formal complaint of sexual 
harassment.181 In the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, a smaller percentage of women 
reported, in some manner, the sexual harassment than in 1995 (thirty-eight 
percent in 1995 versus thirty percent in 2002).182 This decline is especially 
interesting because, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court opined that the 
affirmative defense, articulated in 1998, would encourage more employees to 
report than before the affirmative defense emerged in the legal doctrine.183 The 
2002 study shows that although reporting behavior has changed since the 
affirmative defense was created, the reporting behavior has decreased rather 
than increased. 
Importantly, some research has provided insight into employees’ decisions 
to not report sexual harassment by indicating that filing a formal complaint can, 
in many ways, worsen the employment situation of the employee and increase 
other harms to the employee.184 For instance, the 1995 MSPB federal workplace 
study reported that filing a formal complaint made the situation worse for more 
employees subjected to sexual harassment.185 Studies have shown that employees 
not enough to make it easy or comfortable for employees to complain of workplace harassment.” 
Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1267. 
179. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 374 (citing SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 30). These results are consistent with earlier studies of federal workers 
showing that 11% reported their sexual harassment to superiors, but only 2.5% actually used the 
appropriate formal mechanisms to report. Id. (citing Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual 
Harassment Policies and Procedures, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 497, 498 (1991)). These results are also 
consistent with the raw data from the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, which showed that 85.5% of 
employees did not report the situation to their immediate supervisor, 89.8% of employees did not 
report it to someone else in their chain of command, 88.1% of employees did not report it to the 
supervisor of the person who was engaging in the sexually harassing behavior, 95.9% of employees did 
not report it to the special military office responsible for handling these complaints, and 97.5% of 
employees did not report the behavior to any other military person or office. GREENLEES ET AL., 
supra note 30, at 1229, 1233, 1237, 1241, 1245.  
180. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 31 tbl.9. 
181. Id. at 33-34. 
182. 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at 30. In fact, fewer than ten percent of
employees who experienced incidents of sexual harassment reported it to the designated office 
handling sexual harassment complaints or another official. Id. Instead, twenty-one percent of women 
and twelve percent of men reported to their immediate supervisor, and sixteen percent of women and 
ten percent of men reported to the offender’s supervisor. Id. 
183. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). 
184. See Dansky & Kilpatrick, supra note 139, at 158 (providing insight into employees’ decisions 
not to file formal complaints); Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 3 (demonstrating 
that sexual harassment policies are not necessarily effective in deterring, preventing, or correcting 
sexual harassment). 
185. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 34 (finding that
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who file complaints have experienced retaliation. One study showed that one-
third of the reporters were subjected to retaliation by the employer.186 Another 
one showed that sixty-two percent of the reporters were subjected to retaliation 
by the employer.187 The 2002 Armed Forces Survey found that twenty-nine 
percent of women and twenty-three percent of men reported experiencing work-
related difficulties as the result of sexual harassment or the reporting of it.188 
The 2002 study also showed that women did not report the sexual 
harassment for numerous other reasons, including because they felt 
uncomfortable making a report (thirty-seven percent); because they doubted 
that reporting would have any effect (thirty percent); because they thought they 
would be labeled a troublemaker if they reported (twenty-nine percent); because 
they did not want to hurt the sexual harasser’s career, family or feelings (twenty-
eight percent); because they thought their coworkers would be angry if they 
reported (twenty-three percent); because they feared retaliation from the sexual 
harasser (eighteen percent); because they doubted that they would be believed 
(fifteen percent); because they wanted to fit in (fifteen percent); because they 
thought reporting would negatively impact their performance evaluation or 
promotion consideration (fourteen percent); and because they feared retaliation 
from the sexual harasser’s friends (thirteen percent).189 Similarly, other research 
showed that employees did not report because of their “ambivalence about 
[sexual harassment] policies and the personnel who administer them.”190 
Specifically, several federal workers explained their skepticism of formally 
complaining about sexual harassment because “they were worried that they 
would be blamed for the incident, that they would not be believed, or that the 
complaint would not be kept confidential.”191 The group also worried “that 
management’s reaction to the complaint would be at best ineffectual and at 
worst threatening.”192 Because official sexual harassment policies and 
procedures “reflect the power dynamics at work in particular organizations . . . 
filing of formal complaint for thirty-seven percent of victims of sexual harassment made things worse 
and helped only twenty-one percent of them).  
186. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 375 (citing Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 123). 
187. Id. Dr. Patricia A. Frazier, PhD, after conducting a literature review, found that retaliation
occurs in about one out of four of the cases where the person subjected to sexual harassment formally 
complained. Patricia A. Frazier, Overview of Sexual Harassment from the Behavioral Science 
Perspective, A.B.A. CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., Oct. 15-18, 1997, at *6, available at 
Westlaw, N97SHCB ABA-LGLED B-1. Frazier also noted that twelve percent of women reported 
lower evaluations after complaining, seven percent reported being denied promotions, five percent 
reported being terminated, and two percent reported being reassigned. Id. (citing Pamela Hewitt Loy 
& Lea P. Stewart, The Extent and Effects of the Sexual Harassment of Working Women, 17 SOC. FOCUS 
31, 40 (1984)). 
188. 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at v. 
189. Id. at 34 tbl.4.12.
190. Marshall, supra note 178, at 87. 
191. Id.
192. Id.; see also BEINER, supra note 39, at 161 (“‘[O]rganizational factors were the best
predictors of response when severity of harassment was controlled.’” (quoting Fitzgerald et al., supra 
note 29, at 122)).  
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[they] may dampen rather than promote employee complaints.”193 In addition, 
many women subjected to sexual harassment did not complain formally about 
the harassment because they believed such complaints would be ineffective.194 In 
fact, recent research has found that managers were more likely to side with the 
harasser, seen as the “institution,” over the complainant, seen as the 
“troublemaker.”195 
In addition, some studies showed that persons subjected to sexual 
harassment do not report it because they do not recognize it as sexual 
harassment.196 For instance, the 2002 Armed Forces Survey showed that sixty-
seven percent of women and seventy-eight percent of men stated that they did 
not report incidents of sexual harassment because they felt that the situation was 
not important enough to warrant reporting.197 
Further, many employees do not report sexual harassment formally because 
it would cause other and greater harms to them. For instance, one study showed 
that women who complain about sexual harassment are often fired or may face 
difficulty securing other employment because of bad references.198 One study 
suggested that “‘negative job outcomes may derive more from retaliation and 
negative organizational response (e.g., victim blaming) than from the sexually 
harassing behavior itself.’”199 Another study showed female blue-collar workers 
who confronted their harassers were subjected to more harassment and 
ostracism.200 Another study showed that: 
assertive and formal responses were actually associated with more 
negative outcomes of every sort. Women who reported harassment to 
their supervisors or who filed complaints were more likely to quit, be 
fired, or be transferred; to need or utilize medical and psychological 
assistance; to feel worse about their jobs; and so forth.201  
193. Marshall, supra note 178, at 87. 
194. Krieger, supra note 6, at 185 (citing Laurie A. Rudman et al., Suffering in Silence:
Procedural Justice Versus Gender Socialization Issues in University Sexual Harassment Grievance 
Procedures, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 519, 520 (1995)). 
195. Marshall, supra note 178, at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. BEINER, supra note 39, at 160 (citing Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and
Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152, 
171 (1988)); see also Caroline C. Cochran et al., Predictors of Responses to Unwanted Sexual Attention, 
21 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 207, 217 (1997) (noting that victims frequently did not report incidents 
because they were unsure if behavior was harassment); Schneider et al., supra note 146, at 407 (noting 
that only fifteen percent of female college students labeled their experiences as sexual harassment). 
197. 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at 33. 
198. BEINER, supra note 39, at 164 (citing Audrey Murrell et al., Sexual Harassment and Gender
Discrimination: A Longitudinal Study of Women Managers, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 139, 141 (1995)). 
199. Id. (quoting Hesson-McInnis & Fitzgerald, supra note 151, at 896). 
200. Kristen R. Yount, Ladies, Flirts, and Tomboys: Strategies for Managing Sexual Harassment
in an Underground Coal Mine, 19 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 396, 404 (1991). 
201. Hesson-McInnis & Fitzgerald, supra note 151, at 896. Because this study is older and was
conducted before widespread public attention to sexual harassment, the authors and others note that 
its findings may be limited. See BEINER, supra note 39, at 164 (recognizing that study by Hesson-
McInnis and Fitzgerald was conducted before increased public awareness about sexual harassment). 
778 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
 
In fact, one documented barrier to women employees’ filing of formal 
complaints is the “embarrassment and psychological costs associated with such 
complaints.”202 
On the other hand, reporting harassment to a supervisor or other official 
may be effective in stopping one form of harm—the harassment. The research of 
Dr. Deborah Knapp and her colleagues (hereinafter referred to as Knapp’s 
research) showed that “advocacy seeking” responses, including requesting 
outside intervention, reporting the harassment to a supervisor or to an outside 
agency, and filing a lawsuit, may be effective in ending the harassment.203 Yet a 
different workplace study showed that employees felt that reporting the sexual 
harassment to a supervisor or other official provided mixed results.204 These 
mixed results are not surprising given the research, discussed above, that shows 
that the effectiveness of reporting sexual harassment will depend on the formal 
and informal organizational culture relating to complaints of sexual 
harassment.205 
Unfortunately, the research is silent as to other harms and how they are 
affected by these “advocacy seeking” responses. For example, Knapp’s research 
did not identify the effectiveness of these responses in coping with the intangible 
employment harm or the psychological or emotional harm resulting from the 
sexual harassment. 
202. Marshall, supra note 178, at 87.
203. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 693. Knapp created another typology of responses to the
harm of psychological stress caused by sexual harassment. Her typology of coping mechanisms is 
based on the context of the sexual harassment, such as the mode of response and focus of response. Id. 
at 690-95. Knapp’s research drew on research regarding whistle-blowing behavior as well as coping 
literature. Id. at 696-98. Knapp and her colleagues stated that the coping literature identified two types 
of coping; engagement or problem-focused coping emphasized altering or preventing the situation 
while disengagement or emotion-focused coping was characterized by self-blame, seeking social 
support, avoidance, or distancing. Id. at 698. To determine the victim’s mode of response, Knapp 
considered the amount of outside support being sought through the coping mechanism: the mode may 
be self-response, which involves no outside resources to address sexual harassment, or the mode may 
be a supported response, which means that the harassed woman uses others, such as individuals and 
organizations, to address the sexual harassment. Id. at 691-92. When evaluating the focus of responses 
to harassment, Knapp considered what the focus of the coping mechanisms was: the woman who was 
harassed (self-focused) or the harasser or the event (initiator-focused). Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 
690. Knapp identified four response strategies from these various modes and focuses of responses: (1)
“Avoidance/Denial,” (2) “Social Coping,” (3) “Confrontation/Negotiation,” and (4) “Advocacy
Seeking.” Id. at 690-92. Her research indicated that persons who are sexually harassed tend to employ
more than one response strategy, sometimes sequencing them. Id. at 693. Further, Knapp stated that
“response behavior may vary not only among individuals but also among different environments and
organizational contexts.” Id. at 695. 
204. See SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 31 tbl.9 (noting
that thirty-three percent of male workers and fifty-eight percent of female workers stated that 
reporting sexually harassing behavior to supervisor or other official had beneficial effect on sexual 
harassment, sixteen percent of male workers and thirteen percent of female workers reported that it 
had detrimental effect, and fifty-two percent of male workers and twenty-nine percent of female 
workers stated that it had no effect on sexual harassment).  
205. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of sexual
harassment complaints being filed. 
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And simply because few women file complaints of sexual harassment does 
not mean that they fail to respond or fail to react to the harassment in attempts 
to avoid harm. In fact, women’s most common response to sexual harassment is 
avoiding the harasser himself.206 It appears that those subjected to harassment 
often will avoid the harassment unless the actions taken to avoid harassment 
become intolerable.207 Women employees may also use defusion in response to 
sexual harassment. Defusion is going along with the behavior, perhaps by 
making a joke of it in order to minimize conflict or by stalling.208 Women 
employees appease the harasser by attempting to stop the harasser from 
engaging in sexually harassing behavior without conflict by using humor, 
excuses, or delay.209 Knapp has categorized these types of behavior as an 
“avoidance/denial” behavior.210 Referencing the social science research, 
Chamallas stated that women may use avoidance and appeasement because they 
typically have less power than men in the organization and are reluctant to use 
mechanisms, such as official reporting mechanisms, created by those in power 
because they tend to favor the organization or the harasser rather than not the 
victim of the harassment.211 
206. Schneider, supra note 146, at 408 tbl.2 (showing 74.1% of private sector victims responded
by avoiding harasser, and 53.9% of university sample victims responded by avoiding harasser). Early 
research showed that fifty percent of the women subjected to sexual harassment responded by 
avoiding the harassers. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120; cf. Yoder & Aniakudo, supra note 178, 
at 126 (noting that about half of federal employees avoided harasser (citing Sandra S. Tangri, Martha 
R. Burt & Leanor B. Johnson, Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explanatory Models, 38 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 33, 47 (1982))); Wasti & Cortina, supra note 178, at 402 (noting that Turkish and Hispanic
American women relied on avoidance more than Anglo American women, although all women relied
increasingly on avoidance as harassment increased in frequency)). In addition, in the 2002 Armed
Forces Survey, 60.5% of employees to some extent stayed out of the harasser’s way and 48.8% of
employees to some extent avoided being alone with the harasser. GREENLEES ET AL., supra note 30, at 
1169, 1193.
207. BEINER, supra note 39, at 160. 
208. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 129; see also Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 689 (stating
that defusion also includes such actions as stalling (citing James E. Gruber, How Women Handle 
Sexual Harassment: A Literature Review, 74 SOC. & SOC. RES. 3, 3 (1989))). 
209. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120. Summarizing the previous literature, Fitzgerald notes 
that humor is a common response to less serious harassment. Id. (citing AN UPDATE, supra note 36, at
24; IS IT A PROBLEM?, supra note 36, at 69). Delaying tactics were used by ten percent of blue-collar 
workers as a nonconfrontational way of communicating lack of interest in the harasser. Id. (citing 
James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Blue-Collar Blues: The Sexual Harassment of Women Autoworkers, 9 
WORK & OCCUPATIONS 271, 287 tbl.3 (1982)). 
210. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 690-91. “Avoidance/denial” behaviors include avoiding the
harasser, changing the job situation by quitting or transferring, ignoring the behavior, going along with 
the behavior, treating the event as a joke, doing nothing, and blaming oneself. Id. at 691. Knapp’s 
research shows that avoidance/denial behaviors are coping mechanisms that are self-focused and done 
without outside support. Id. at 690. In a different study, twenty-five percent of female faculty reported 
that ignoring the sexually harassing behavior was effective. Frazier, supra note 187, at *6 (citing 
Elizabeth Grauerholz, Sexual Harassment of Women Professors by Students: Exploring the Dynamics 
of Power, Authority, and Gender in a University Setting, 21 SEX ROLES 789, 797 tbl.3 (1989)). 
211. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 376 (citing James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Women’s Responses
to Sexual Harassment: An Analysis of Sociocultural, Organizational, and Personal Resource Models, 67 
SOC. SCI. Q. 814, 821 (1986); Jennie Kihnley, Unraveling the Ivory Fabric: Institutional Obstacles to the 
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The effectiveness of these “avoidance/denial” behaviors in reducing all 
harms seems mixed. The research shows that some of these actions reduce 
certain harms while increasing others. The 1995 MSPB federal workplace study 
showed that victims of sexual harassment found that avoiding the harasser 
beneficially affected the sexual harassment.212 On the other hand, the MSPB 
study hypothesized, without offering any supporting data, that avoiding the 
harasser “can also have a negative effect on the victim’s work performance, if 
she or he spends a lot of time trying to avoid the harasser.”213 Commentators 
have found that actions to avoid the harasser and ignore the harassment may 
create additional benefits, such as avoiding potential retaliation, for victims.214 
The same MSPB study showed mixed results for defusion responses to 
sexual harassment as well. One commentator noted that making a joke of the 
harassment “may well be an attempt by the target [of the sexual harassment] to 
fit in and downplay the effects of the harassment.”215 Another study showed that 
women miners who tried to fit in and be “one of the boys” were subjected to less 
harassment.216 
Dr. Knapp’s research looked at these behaviors as a whole under the 
category of “avoidance/denial” behaviors. Dr. Knapp and her colleagues found 
that these behaviors are coping mechanisms that are generally more effective 
than other strategies in ending one specific type of harm: the sexual harassment 
behavior.217 Their findings do not indicate whether these behaviors are effective 
at ending the emotional harm, the psychological harm, the tangible employment 
harm, or the intangible employment harm resulting from sexual harassment. 
Handling of Sexual Harassment Complaints, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 69, 86 (2000); Riger, supra note 
179, at 501). 
212. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 31 tbl.19 (noting
fifty-two percent of male employees and forty-four percent of female employees found that avoiding 
harasser beneficially affected sexual harassment, thirteen percent of male employees and eight percent 
of female employees found that such behavior negatively affected sexual harassment, and thirty-six 
percent of male employees and forty-eight percent of female employees found that avoiding harasser 
had no impact on sexual harassment).  
213. Id. at 31; see also BEINER, supra note 39, at 83 (avoiding harasser may interfere with
employee’s ability to work “as the target rearranges his or her job duties to avoid the harasser” (citing 
Cochran et al., supra note 196, at 223)); Frazier, supra note 187, at *6 (noting “those who avoided were 
less satisfied with the outcome of the situation in another study” (citing Cochran, supra note 196, at 
224)).  
214. BEINER, supra note 39, at 83 (citing Aysan Sev’er, Sexual Harassment: Where We Were,
Where We Are and Prospects for the New Millennium, 36 CANADIAN REV. SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 
469, 478 (1999)).  
215. Id. at 82. 
216. Yount, supra note 200, at 416. Yount also found that female miners’ flirting resulted in
decreased harassment in the short term but in the long run led to more harassment. Id. at 407-09, 411-
12. The results of the MSPB study correspond to the findings of sociologist Mary Lindenstein Walshok 
of various blue-collar workplaces. MARY LINDENSTEIN WALSHOK, BLUE-COLLAR WOMEN: PIONEERS
ON THE MALE FRONTIER 232, 239-40 (1981) (finding that female employees’ integration into dominant 
group correlates to decreased targeting for sexual harassment but recognizing potential risk that fitting 
in may have negative consequence that victims are seen as welcoming sexual harassment). 
217. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 690-91. 
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In addition to the “avoidance/denial” responses, women employees also use 
so-called “assertive” responses, such as directly telling the harasser to stop,218 
threatening to report the harasser,219 or verbally or physically attacking the 
harasser.220 Taking each so-called “assertive” response in turn, some research 
shows that the strategy of confronting the harasser is effective in ending the 
harassment.221 In fact, one review of the literature identified confronting the 
harasser as the most effective strategy at decreasing the harassment.222 
218. Forty-four percent of female respondents in one study responded to sexual harassment by
confronting the harasser. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 121 (citing IS IT A PROBLEM?, supra note 
36, at 18). In the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, 68.2% of employees to some extent told the harasser of 
their dislike for the harassment, 61.2% of employees to some extent told the harasser to stop, and 
41.3% of employees to some extent asked the harasser to leave them alone. GREENLEES ET AL., supra 
note 30, at 1165, 1197, 1205; see also Yoder & Aniakudo, supra note 178, at 130 (stating that eighty-six 
percent of study participants challenged harasser); id. at 126 (noting that sixteen percent of another 
study’s participants ordered harasser to stop) (citing Mary Ellen Reilly, Bernice Lott & Sheila M. 
Gallogly, Sexual Harassment of University Students, 15 SEX ROLES 333, 346 (1986)). In one study, 
twenty-four percent of the subjects proposed that the sexual harassment victim verbally challenge the 
harasser or inform authorities of the harassment. Tricia S. Jones & Martin S. Remland, Sources of 
Variability in Perceptions of and Responses to Sexual Harassment, 27 SEX ROLES 121, 138 (1992); see 
also Wasti & Cortina, supra note 178, at 402 (noting that Turkish women indicated greater propensity 
than Hispanic American and Anglo American working women to confront harasser). 
219. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 121 (stating that fourteen percent of women subjected to
sexual harassment threatened to disclose harassment to harasser’s coworkers). 
220. Fifteen percent of blue-collar workers responded verbally and seven percent responded
physically. Id. at 121; see also Yoder & Aniakudo, supra note 178, at 130 (finding that of nineteen 
study participants, nine responded “assertively” and ten responded “aggressively,” including four who 
used physical force). Yoder and Aniakudo’s study suggested that black female firefighters responded 
to harassment first assertively with direct confrontation, then if unsuccessful, aggressively and possibly 
by taking legal recourse. Yoder & Aniakudo, supra note 178, at 135. Interestingly, Yoder and 
Aniakudo hypothesized that the women used confrontation because it proved successful and 
permitted them to retain their dignity. Because the women were marginalized at work, possibly due to 
their gender and race, they felt that they had little to lose when challenging their harassers. Id. at 132. 
Unsurprisingly, the women’s circumstances influenced their responses to sexual harassment. See 
Phoebe A. Morgan, Risking Relationships: Understanding the Litigation Choices of Sexually Harassed 
Women, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 67, 86-88 (1999) (finding that relationships with children, spouses, and 
parents, and availability of moral and emotional support, influenced women’s litigation decisions, and 
if filing suit appeared likely to detrimentally affect family members, women relied on “extralegal 
means to solve their sexual harassment problems”). 
221. E.g., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 31 (discussing
study finding that of those who asked or told person to stop, sixty-one percent of male employees and 
sixty percent of female employees indicated that their response made things better regarding sexual 
harassment, fifteen percent of male employees and eight percent of female employees reported that 
telling harasser to stop made sexual harassment worse, and twenty-five percent of male employees and 
thirty-two percent of female employees believed that it made no difference); Shereen G. Bingham & 
Lisa L. Scherer, Factors Associated with Responses to Sexual Harassment and Satisfaction with 
Outcome, 29 SEX ROLES 239, 248 (1993) (observing that knowledge about effect of confrontation of 
harassers by victims is limited, but some research suggests that such confrontations can be helpful); 
Cochran et al., supra note 196, at 224 (reporting that victims who confronted sexual harassers 
experienced greater satisfaction); see also, e.g., Krieger, supra note 6, at 190 (showing that fifty to sixty 
percent of harassed women found confrontation effective). 
222. Frazier, supra note 187, at *6. Interestingly, Dr. Frazier posed the important question of why 
we prioritize reporting the harassment rather than facilitating the conversations between the person 
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Regarding employees who threatened the harasser that they would tell others 
about his harassment, one workplace study showed that many employees found 
this response to affect beneficially the sexual harassment itself.223 One review of 
the literature showed that “confronting [the harasser] is rated more effective 
than other strategies, but it only seems to be effective about half of the time.”224  
The research, however, is scant as to whether such “assertive” responses 
decrease or increase harms other than the actual sexual harassment.225 A few 
studies do show that “assertive” responses increase job harm and emotional 
harm. One study found that “women who used aggressive communication 
strategies, such as using threats to get the person to stop, were less satisfied with 
the outcome of the situation than those who used less aggressive strategies.”226 
Some of the reasons for finding the confrontation action ineffective or not 
satisfying may be related to the resulting retaliation on the job that resulted from 
the confrontation.227 This retaliation included such job harm as lower 
performance evaluations, nonpromotion, reassignment, and termination.228 
Women who were sexually harassed also used negotiation, which included 
efforts to make the harasser stop without involving the employer.229 Knapp’s 
research showed that these responses, which she categorized as 
“confrontation/negotiation” behaviors,230 were “associated with greater 
being harassed and the harasser if the goal was true deterrence. Id. She partially answered her own 
question by stating that reporting may provide some punishment value, though punishment not one of 
the rationales provided by the Supreme Court in articulating the affirmative defense. Id.; see also 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (describing policies behind affirmative 
defense); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (same).  
223. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 31 (indicating that
fifty-five percent of male employees and thirty-seven percent of female employees subjected to sexual 
harassment found that threatening to tell or telling others about harassment beneficially affected 
sexual harassment, no male employees and fourteen percent of female employees found such action to 
make sexual harassment worse, and forty-six percent of male employees and forty-nine percent of 
female employees found such action to have no effect on sexual harassment). 
224. Frazier, supra note 187, at *5. 
225. See, e.g., Bingham & Scherer, supra note 221, at 263 (citing difficulty in drawing conclusions
about effect of aggressive responses to sexual harassment). 
226. Frazier, supra note 187, at *5 (citing Bingham & Scherer, supra note 221, at 263-65). 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at *6 (citing Loy & Stewart, supra note 187, at 40) (finding that of those who were
harassed and confronted their harassers, twelve percent received lower performance evaluations, 
seven percent were not promoted, five percent were terminated, and two percent were reassigned); see 
also Krieger, supra note 6, at 190-91 (identifying that more recent studies have yielded similar results. 
229. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120; see also Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 689 (stating
that negotiation may include direct requests for harasser to stop behavior (citing Gruber, supra note 
208, at 3)); Wasti & Cortina, supra note 178, at 402 (noting that in studying responses to sexual 
harassment reported by Turkish, Hispanic American, and Anglo American working women, 
researchers found that Turkish women relied on negotiation more than Anglo American women, 
working class women relied more on negotiation than professional women when harasser was of a 
high status, and all women relied increasingly on negotiation responses as harassment incidences 
increased). 
230. Knapp’s research showed that these responses focus on the harasser and involve little
outside support. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 692. 
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emotional distress,”231 even though they seemed to be effective in ending the 
behavior.232 Unfortunately, the Knapp research was silent as to the tangible and 
intangible employment-related harms associated with “confrontation/ 
negotiation” behaviors. Therefore, although the research is limited, taking the 
research as a whole, it appears that “assertive” responses are mixed in their 
success of harm avoidance. Although “assertive” responses can be effective in 
decreasing the sexual harassment, that impact must be weighed against the fact 
that such responses increase the tangible job harm through retaliation and 
increase the emotional distress.  
Women also attempt to avoid harm by seeking social and family support in 
an effort to cope with the sexual harassment.233 Knapp stated that these 
responses were not effective in stopping the harassment, “although [they] may 
assist the target in managing the psychological and somatic outcomes associated 
with the event and may provide him or her with suggestions for more effective 
coping.”234 In addition, seeking medical or emotional counseling was included in 
this category of responses, and although it was not necessarily effective in ending 
the harassment, “counseling may assist the individual in diffusing the event and 
finding more effective solutions to the problem.”235 Therefore, although the 
research is again limited, it indicates that seeking social and family support has 
no impact on the sexual harassment but helps to avoid the psychological, 
emotional, and physical harms of sexual harassment.236 The research is silent as 
to the effect of these coping mechanisms in avoiding or mitigating tangible or 
intangible employment harm, although such support seeking may result in the 
employee’s learning of new harm avoidance mechanisms. And, as seen above in 
the discussion of Chamallas’s theory, a decrease in emotional harm should 
benefit employment performance and productivity.237 
231. Id. (citing Joy A. Livingston, Responses to Sexual Harassment on the Job: Legal,
Organizational, and Individual Actions, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES 5, 13 (1982)). 
232. Id. 
233. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120-21 (citing IS IT A PROBLEM?, supra note 36, at 69) 
(finding that sixty-eight percent of study respondents talked with colleagues about sexual harassment 
and sixty percent talked with friends and family members); see also Knapp et al., supra note 35, at 689 
(recognizing practice of “using sympathetic others to express anger and provide emotional support” 
(citing Gruber, supra note 208, at 3)); Wasti & Cortina, supra note 178, at 402 (noting that Turkish, 
Hispanic American, and Anglo American women relied on friends, family, and coworkers on a 
relatively equal basis, except that professional women relied increasingly on social support as 
harassment incidences increased). Social coping responses, which include self-focused strategies that 
seek outsider support, may rely on ensuring that others are present when the harasser is present or 
discussing harassment with others who are sympathetic, such as peers, coworkers, friends, and family. 
Id. at 692. In the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, 32.9% of employees to some extent talked to family 
about the situation; 49.2% of employees to some extent talked to their coworkers about the situation; 
47.8% of employees to some extent talked to their friends about the situation; and 7.7% of employees 
to some extent talked to a chaplain or counselor about the situation. GREENLEES ET AL., supra note 
30, at 1177, 1181, 1185, 1189.  
234. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 692. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chamallas’s theory. 
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In sum, the research shows that while there are multiple externally focused 
harm avoidance mechanisms, not one particular mechanism can help the 
employee to avoid all the harms of sexual harassment. Rather, what emerges 
from the research is that each mechanism, based on the context, may result in 
both increasing and decreasing different harms. 
3. Internally Focused Harm Avoidance Mechanisms Documented in the
Social Science Literature
Women who are sexually harassed also utilize internal coping mechanisms 
to regulate and manage cognitive and emotional harms resulting from the sexual 
harassment.238 These responses focus on an individual’s personal management of 
cognitive and emotional reactions.239 Prior to Dr. Fitzgerald’s work in this area, 
researchers commonly mislabeled the employee as being “passive”240 in part 
because the internally focused responses were not visible to outsiders.241 
One internally focused strategy used in response to sexual harassment is 
endurance, which is tolerating the harassment because it is unavoidable, one 
knows of no other option, or one is afraid.242 Previous research mistakenly 
labeled this as a lack of response because endurance would often be externally 
manifested as “ignore[ing] the situation” or “doing nothing.”243 In addition, 
women subjected to sexual harassment employ thought avoidance as a coping 
strategy, which includes ignoring thoughts about the harassment.244 Other coping 
mechanisms include denial, which is deliberately deciding to “ignore the 
situation, to pretend it is not happening, or that one does not care”;245 
238. Fitzgerald & Ormerod, supra note 125, at 572.
239. Id. 
240. Yoder & Aniakudo, supra note 178, at 126-27 (citing, inter alia, Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 
209, at 819; Reilly, Lott & Gallogly, supra note 218, at 346; Sandra S. Tangri, Martha R. Burt & 
Leanor B. Johnson, Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explanatory Models, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES 33, 47-
48 (1982); AN UPDATE, supra note 36, at 24).  
241. Krieger, supra note 6, at 181-82 (describing how internally focused strategies to cope with
sexual harassment were previously inaccurately categorized as passive responses). 
242. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120. In the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, 64.3% of
employees tolerated the harassment to some extent. GREENLEES ET AL., supra note 30, at 1201.  
243. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120. 
244. Id. Avoidance has been defined as a “passive” response that may include behavior such as
ignoring the sexual harassment or doing nothing. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 689 (indicating that 
Gruber’s “avoidance” response category included “most passive responses,” such as ignoring harasser 
or doing nothing (citing Gruber, supra note 208, at 3)). As noted in the DSM-IV, those employees 
suffering from PTSD, a harm that may result from sexual harassment, will attempt to “avoid thoughts, 
feelings, or conversations about the traumatic event . . . and to avoid activities, situations, or people 
who arouse recollections of it.” DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, supra note 143, at 424-25. In 
the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, 72.4% of employees tried to forget about the harassment to some 
extent and 65.8% of employees to some extent told themselves it was not important. GREENLEES ET 
AL., supra note 30, at 1161, 1173.  
245. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120. In the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, 43.1% of
employees to some extent pretended not to notice the harassment. GREENLEES ET AL., supra note 30, 
at 1221.  
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detachment;246 self-blame,247 or believing one has illusory control over the 
situation;248 and reattribution, such as reinterpreting the situation in order to 
make it not able to be categorized as harassment249 or empathizing with the 
harasser.250 
The research indicates that these internal coping mechanisms are helpful in 
eliminating some of the emotional and psychological harm in the short run.251 
The research also indicates that whether these strategies are effective in avoiding 
emotional and psychological harm in the long run depends on the individual 
person.252 Unfortunately, the research is again silent as to the effect of these 
internal coping mechanisms on other forms of harm, though one would 
anticipate they do not decrease sexual harassment. There may be a possibility 
that such internally focused strategies could decrease job harm because, as 
Chamallas states, there is an interconnection between psychological harm and 
job harm.253  
4. Lena’s Harm Avoidance Responses
Returning to Lena’s situation, after considering the social psychology 
research, the workplace studies, and the policy behind the avoidable 
consequences doctrine, a more complete picture of Lena—the harms she has 
suffered and the actions she took to avoid harm—emerges for the liability 
determination. Perhaps most importantly, by considering all of Lena’s externally 
and internally focused actions, Lena clearly appears as an actor—she is 
responding to the sexual harassment, she is harm avoiding, she is not passive. 
Her actions are many. 
Lena employed a variety of externally focused coping mechanisms to avoid 
harm. She physically avoided Dave by calling in sick frequently, avoiding 
overtime work, and asking that her meetings with Dave be in her cubicle rather 
than in his closed office. Lena also appeased Dave by trying to deter him without 
246. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120 (stating that very little research has been conducted on 
prevalence of detachment as coping strategy by women who are sexually harassed). 
247. GREENLEES ET AL., supra note 30, at 1209 (finding that in 2002 Armed Forces Survey,
fifteen percent of employees to some extent blamed themselves for what was happening).  
248. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120 (citing study that found that twenty-five percent of
female victims attributed harassment in some way to their own behavior (citing Inger W. Jensen & 
Barbara A. Gutek, Attributions and Assignment of Responsibility in Sexual Harassment, 38 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 121, 127 (1982))). Other than the Jensen and Gutek study, little else is known about the 
prevalence of illusory control in sexual harassment victims. Id. 
249. Id. (citing Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 209, at 286). In the 2002 Armed Forces Survey,
thirty-four percent of employees to some extent assumed the harasser meant well. GREENLEES ET AL., 
supra note 30, at 1213. 
250. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 119-20 (stating that, similar to research regarding
detachment and illusory control, research on reattribution needs to be studied further to understand 
its rate of utilization by women who are sexually harassed). 
251. Fitzgerald & Ormerod, supra note 125, at 572.
252. Id. 
253. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chamallas’s theory on
how psychological stress and job harm are related. 
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conflict when she moved her body away from him and by standing up to leave a 
meeting with a false, work-related excuse. Lena also informally complained to 
Victor. She then stopped giving Victor information once he humiliated her. Lena 
sought social support by telling Karen, her best friend, about Dave’s sexual 
harassment of her and how it made her feel. Lena also used the internally 
focused mechanism of reattributing Dave’s sexual harassment of her as 
accidental or resulting from Dave’s personality as a “touchy” person. Finally, 
Lena endured the harassment and did not formally complain in order to lessen 
further humiliation and avoid ostracism and possible retaliation. 
According to Knapp’s research and other studies, Lena’s externally focused 
appeasement and avoidance behaviors could be effective at stopping the sexual 
harassment but may impair Lena’s ability to perform her work.254 Unfortunately, 
the research is silent as to how avoidance actions impact emotional and 
psychological harms.255 Knapp’s research also indicates that while Lena’s 
discussions with Karen are not effective at ending the sexual harassment, they 
may be effective in managing her resulting emotional and psychological harm.256 
Regarding Lena’s informal complaint to Victor, the informal organizational 
structure impacted the effectiveness of her complaint.257 Victor responded with a 
joke and did not follow up in any way. This response resulted in Lena feeling 
humiliated and not complaining further. And the sexual harassment continued. 
Therefore, in this situation, reporting did not avoid any of her harms. The 
research indicates that Lena’s use of reattribution may be helpful in eliminating 
some of the emotional and psychological harm as well. Lena’s endurance of the 
harassment is an internally focused coping mechanism designed to avoid the 
harm of the stress of sexual harassment. The mechanism may vary in its 
effectiveness at reducing the harm in the short and long term. Unfortunately, the 
research is silent as to the effect of internal coping mechanisms on avoiding other 
harms from sexual harassment such as the acts of sexual harassment and 
employment-related harms. 
Nonetheless, through this discussion, it becomes apparent that broader 
notions of avoiding harm will result in a more complete view of Lena and how 
she is attempting to mitigate her damages and avoid injury. Such a view permits 
a more thorough liability determination under the affirmative defense because 
the court can determine more accurately whether Lena is reasonably avoiding 
harm, such as sexual harassment, emotional harm, and psychological harm, by 
actions other than filing a formal complaint. At the same time, the complexity of 
determining whether an employee has reasonably avoided or attempted to avoid 
harm becomes clear. Perhaps the most striking example of this complexity is the 
254. See supra notes 210, 217 and accompanying text for a discussion of Knapp’s theories on the
effectiveness of avoidance behaviors and the impact on the victim’s job performance. 
255. Id. 
256. See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effectiveness of
seeking social and family support.  
257. See infra notes 304-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts have viewed
alternative or informal methods of “avoiding harm” that are not included in the employer’s sexual 
harassment policy. 
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research that supports Lena’s experience that complaining about the harassment 
increased her emotional harm.258 
IV. EMPLOYER LIABILITY AND “AVOIDING HARM OTHERWISE”
As previously stated, in deciding liability for supervisor sexual harassment 
cases, the courts to date have focused primarily on the limited questions of 
whether the employer had a policy, and, if so, whether the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to use the formal complaint mechanism pursuant to the 
policy.259 The courts have also examined whether the employer properly 
responded to any employee reporting of sexual harassment.260 In evaluating 
whether the employer satisfied the employer-focused prong, the courts have 
focused on whether the company had a nonharassment policy and whether the 
policy contained an appropriate complaint mechanism.261 In general, despite the 
fact that harm avoidance is an animating principle of the affirmative defense,262 
the courts have not scrutinized the effectiveness of employer policies in avoiding 
harm. Specifically, the courts have not properly scrutinized whether an 
employer’s policy was actually effective in getting employees to report sexual 
harassment or whether the complaint mechanism effectively deterred sexual 
harassment and protected employees from retaliation.263 Such failings show that 
258. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of how complaining about
the harassment may result in humiliation, embarrassment, and the attachment of negative stigmas. 
259. See Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1285-86 (noting that in study of seventy-two
cases, employer defendants were granted summary judgment in all twenty cases in which employee 
failed to complain pursuant to employer harassment policy and employer generally exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct sexual harassment); see, e.g., Fisher v. Elec. Data Sys., 278 F. 
Supp. 2d 980, 993 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff failed to report 
harassment pursuant to employer’s plan); Taylor v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 
700CV145-R, 2001 WL 1012803, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2001) (denying summary judgment because 
plaintiff reported harassment pursuant to employer’s plan). 
260. See Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1281, 1292 (showing that if employee properly
complained, courts also have examined whether employer responded appropriately to complaint, such 
as by conducting an investigation or changing environment to control harassment, and whether 
employee reasonably participated in investigation process). Such actions relate to the employer 
prong’s requirement that the “employer exercise[] reasonable care to . . . correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
261. E.g., Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that “the existence [of sexual
harassment policy] militates strongly in favor of a conclusion that the employer ‘exercised reasonable 
care to prevent’ and promptly correct sexual harassment” (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807)); see also 
Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 11 (“Courts have been strict with employers who 
do not meet this basic requirement of having a policy specifically dealing with sexual harassment, but 
have been flexible in approving different types of policies.”).  
262. See supra Part I for a discussion of affirmative defenses to sexual harassment. 
263. See, e.g., Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that distribution of acceptable policy equates to convincing proof of sufficient prevention that 
can be rebutted only by evidence that “‘employer adopted or administered [a policy] in bad faith or 
that the policy was otherwise defective or dysfunctional’” (quoting Brown, 184 F.3d at 396)); see also 
Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 811 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that company’s distribution of 
acceptable policy often satisfies first prong of affirmative defense). 
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“file cabinet compliance,”264 having a policy regardless of its effectiveness, is 
credited to the employer even though it is not necessarily related to decreasing 
sexual harassment or otherwise avoiding the harms of sexual harassment.265 
The focus of this Part is to examine the case doctrine regarding the 
employee-focused prong of the affirmative defense and how such doctrine meets 
or fails to meet the driving rationale of avoiding harm. Since the Supreme Court 
first articulated the employer’s affirmative defense to hostile work environment 
sexual harassment, the courts have failed to analyze all of the types of harm 
experienced by women employees subjected to supervisor sexual harassment. 
Similarly, the courts have failed to acknowledge fully all of the strategies such 
employees use to avoid those harms. As a result, because courts have judged 
employees’ responses almost exclusively based on whether employees reported 
the sexual harassment,266 and because few employees actually do so,267 the courts 
have regularly found no employer liability due to the employers’ satisfaction of 
the employee-focused prong.268 One study showed that between June 1998 and 
January 2000, courts dismissed approximately seventy percent of supervisor 
sexual harassment cases based on defendants’ ability to prevail on the 
affirmative defense.269 Such a limited analysis of harms and harm avoidance is 
inconsistent with the affirmative defense and the policy behind it and Title VII. 
This Part analyzes the body of case law regarding the employee-focused prong 
and concludes that the courts are almost consistently failing to properly credit 
employees with all of their harm avoidance actions and thus are not properly 
determining liability for supervisor sexual harassment. 
A. “Avoid Harm Otherwise” Analysis Absent from Court Decisions
Regarding the employee-focused prong of the affirmative defense, many
courts simply fail to consider whether the employee “avoided harm otherwise” 
264. Lawton, supra note 6, at 198. 
265. Id. 
266. See supra note 263 and accompanying text for examples of how courts almost exclusively
look to whether employees reported the harassment instead of using other avoidance mechanisms. 
267. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of research indicating that
sexually harassed victims are unlikely to file a formal complaint. 
268. See Shaw, 180 F.3d at 812-13 (finding affirmative defense to protect employer when
harassment policy complaint procedure was not used by employee even though employee claimed to 
have never seen policy); Fisher v. Elec. Data Sys., 278 F. Supp. 2d 980, 993 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (finding 
no liability for employer, as employer exerted reasonable care and employee unreasonably failed to 
take advantage of complaint filing procedure). 
269. Marks, supra note 6, at 1453-54; Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1280-81; see also 
Chamallas, supra note 13, at 325 (stating that numerous courts have ruled in favor of employers on 
summary judgment since affirmative defense was created); Grossman, The First Bite, supra note 6, at 
708-15 (stating that many trial courts do not examine facts to determine if employee complaint prior to
harassment could have prevented harassment—instead they simply assume hostile work environment
exists and look to see whether employer has sufficient evidence to prevail on affirmative defense). But 
see Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
548, 591 (2001) (explaining that prior to affirmative defense, plaintiffs who did not report harassment
lost majority of time). 
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when analyzing the affirmative defense. This failure is a result of either 
conflating the two components of the employee-focused prong into one 
component or truncating the prong to exclude the “avoid harm otherwise” 
component altogether. For example, some courts simply delete the “avoid harm 
otherwise” component from the affirmative defense and state that the employer 
need show only that plaintiff failed to utilize the employer’s preventative or 
corrective opportunities.270 More often, the courts recognize that the avoid harm 
otherwise component is a part of the rule but then fail to analyze it. These courts 
then conflate the two components of the employee-focused prong into the single 
analysis of whether the employee complained pursuant to the company’s policy 
and cooperated in any subsequent investigation.271  
One case exemplifying this conflation is Lane v. State of Oregon Department 
of Corrections.272 In this case, the court denied defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment stating that there was a dispute of facts as to the reasonableness of the 
employee’s failure to timely initiate a report of her supervisor’s sexual 
harassment.273 The court found that because the supervisor had threatened that 
more harm would result if she complained and because the supervisor was 
respected and seen as a father-figure by other employees, a fact finder could 
decide it was not unreasonable for the employee to not timely complain.274 
In denying the summary judgment motion, the court did not conduct any 
analysis of the “avoid harm otherwise” component, though there were many 
facts relevant to this analysis. For instance, the record showed that the employee, 
Lane, took specific actions in response to the sexual harassment in an attempt to 
mitigate her resulting harms. In order to mitigate possible job loss, Lane did not 
timely report the sexual harassment. She was a trial employee and feared 
termination because she was actually told by her supervisor that everyone would 
believe him and not her if she were to complain.275 In addition, Lane stated that 
she did not file a complaint initially because “those in the chain of command 
were ‘tight,’ and she did not want the humiliation and embarrassment associated 
270. See, e.g., Olson v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 130 Fed. App’x 380, 389-90 (11th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing that second prong of affirmative defense is met where employee unreasonably failed to 
take advantage of employer’s preventative and corrective opportunities); Newman v. Coll. of 
Mainland, No. G-05-667, 2006 WL 3391445, at *5 n.8 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2006) (finding that defendant 
did not meet burden of demonstrating that plaintiff failed to “take advantage of any preventative or 
corrective opportunities”); MacKenzie v. Potter, No. 04-C-4070, 2006 WL 1005127, at *7, *9 (N.D. Ill. 
Apr. 14, 2006) (correctly stating rule initially, but in actual analysis of employee-focused prong, failing 
to identify “avoid harm otherwise” component).  
271. See, e.g., Jernigan v. Alderwoods Group, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1197 (D. Or. 2007) 
(misstating prong as requiring employer-defendant to show that plaintiff “unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided [by the employer] to avoid harm”). 
Following the courts’ lead, scholars often conflate the two components of the employee-focused prong 
as well. See, e.g., Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1290 (finding employee’s failure to report is 
“tantamount to per se ‘unreasonable’ behavior” under employee-focused prong).  
272. 2006 WL 3762104, No. G-05-1497-AA, at *6 (D. Or. Dec. 18, 2006). 
273. Id. at *7. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. at *4.
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with filing a complaint of sexual harassment.”276 Therefore, in not initially filing 
her complaint, Lane was managing the effect of reporting the harassment on two 
different harms—Lane was attempting to balance the increased emotional harms 
that would result from the filing with the potential that reporting might decrease 
the incidence of the sexual harassment itself. Lane also avoided her emotional 
harm and the sexual harassment when she made up “excuses so that ‘[the 
supervisor] would get the hint and not continue.’ For example, when [the 
supervisor] asked Lane if she ‘was ever going to meet him,’ Lane told [him] 
directly that she would not because of his wife, after which they rarely spoke.”277 
This action by Lane is a great example of the use of the external coping 
mechanism of assertion in order to manage the stressor—the harm—of sexual 
harassment.278 Moreover, based on the court’s recounting of the supervisor’s 
response to Lane’s avoidance behavior, her behavior actually succeeded in 
stopping his sexual advances.279 Accordingly, Lane took multiple harm 
avoidance actions. Nonetheless, the court did not use these harm avoidance 
actions as part of its affirmative defense analysis under the “avoid harm 
otherwise” component. Rather, the court only focused on the reasonableness of 
her failure to initiate a complaint, and that determination did not adequately 
acknowledge Lane’s full range of harms other than sexual harassment and her 
multiple harm avoidance actions other than reporting the harassment. 
Returning to Lena and her situation, despite her multiple harms and harm 
avoidance actions discussed above, a court, following the trend in Lane and 
other court decisions, would inappropriately omit any “avoid harm otherwise” 
analysis in determining liability. Lena’s employer would most likely prevail on 
the affirmative defense and avoid liability by concentrating on the employer-
focused prong and the first component of the employee-focused prong. 
Specifically, the employer would show that it had a policy and that Lena 
“unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive and corrective 
opportunities” by failing to file a formal complaint under the policy.280 The 
employer and the court would either ignore the second component of the 
employee-focused prong altogether or conflate it with the first component.281 As 
a result, they would pay no attention to Lena’s other actions that were taken to 
avoid harm, including those harms other than sexual harassment. Lena might 
argue that it was not “unreasonable” for her to fail to complain because of 
Victor’s response to her informal complaint.282 To date, such arguments, by and 
276. Id. at *6.
277. Lane, 2006 WL 3762104, at *6 (citation omitted).
278. See supra notes 178-84, 206-11, 218-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of employee
coping mechanisms. 
279. Lane, 2006 WL 3762104, at *6 (explaining that Lane’s supervisor rarely spoke to her after
she told him she would not “meet” him because he was married). 
280. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
281. See supra note 39 and accompanying text for a discussion of limited applications of the
second prong.  
282. A very common analysis under the employee-focused prong is whether any delay by
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large, have been unsuccessful.283 Lena might also argue that her failure to 
complain was not “unreasonable” given her other actions to try to avoid the 
harm, such as moving away from Dave when he touched her inappropriately, 
avoiding Dave at work, trying to defuse the situation, and discussing her problem 
and the emotional toll on her with Karen.284 Such arguments are becoming a bit 
more frequent in courts and courts have responded to these arguments with 
mixed success. At times, courts recognize that such actions may be a reasonable 
justification for employees’ delay in reporting, but usually courts do not credit 
the employees with avoiding their harm.285 
As a result, despite the affirmative defense’s inclusion of the word 
“otherwise” to indicate that availing oneself of the employer’s formal 
mechanisms might be one of many ways to avoid harm,286 in Lena’s case a 
narrow liability interpretation by the court most likely would only examine 
whether Lena complained pursuant to the employer’s policy.287 This narrow 
plaintiff in reporting the sexual harassment was “reasonable.” See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 
F.3d 1158, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff’s hesitation in complaining to employer was
unreasonable); Hardy v. Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 328 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that second
prong was not satisfied because employer could not demonstrate that plaintiff’s delay in filing
complaint was unreasonable); Payano v. Fordham Tremont CMHC, 287 F. Supp. 2d 470, 477
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining that, despite plaintiff’s fear, his failure to complain pursuant to policy was
unreasonable); see also Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 21-23 (discussing
reasonableness of plaintiff’s failure to complain). 
283. See, e.g., Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1178-79 (finding plaintiff’s failure to complain third time was 
unreasonable, despite her discomfort and dissatisfaction with how employer handled situation on 
previous occasions). But see Lane v. Or. Dep’t of Corr., No. G-05-1497-AA, 2006 WL 3762104, at *7 
(D. Or. Dec. 18, 2006) (recognizing outstanding factual issue as to whether employee’s failure to 
initiate a timely complaint was unreasonable under circumstances). 
284. See supra Parts II and III.B.4 for a discussion of Lena’s harm avoidance actions based on
the social science research regarding coping mechanisms for the stressors of sexual harassment. 
285. See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Potter, No. 04-C-4070, 2006 WL 1005127, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14,
2006) (finding plaintiff’s attempts to ignore and personally remedy harassing behavior could not 
explain unreasonably long wait to file formal complaint, which denied employer chance to remedy 
situation). Clearly in Mackenzie, the plaintiff was employing harm avoidance mechanisms. Because the 
court failed to conduct an “avoid harm otherwise” analysis, the court did not credit plaintiff with any 
of her actions. See Mackenzie, 2006 WL 1005127, at *9 (finding that plaintiff unreasonably failed to 
take advantage of employer’s corrective procedure due to seven-month delay in reporting). The 
court’s failure could be attributed to its incorrect reliance on notice to employer, rather than harm 
avoidance, as the policy rationale underlying the affirmative defense and liability determinations. See 
infra Part V.B for a discussion of how the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the affirmative 
defense should be discussed and analyzed in liability determinations of supervisor sexual harassment 
cases. 
286. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). But see Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 3 (suggesting that 
sexual harassment policies are not necessarily effective in deterring, preventing, or correcting sexual 
harassment). 
287. In fact, one study shows that courts fail to consider any employee-related conduct, save for
whether she filed a formal complaint of sexual harassment, in analyzing the employee-focused prong 
of the entire affirmative defense. Sherwyn, Heise, & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1285-86. This study shows 
that as long as the employer had an adequate policy and an adequate response to workplace sexual 
harassment, the employer would prevail on both prongs of the affirmative defense. Id. at 1286. 
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interpretation is consistent with many court decisions.288 There would likely be 
no focus on the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the affirmative defense. 
As a result of its lack of attention to the second component, the court would fail 
in basing its liability decision on the affirmative defense’s animating principle of 
harm avoidance. 
An even larger problem created by such an analysis is that the court would 
be constructing Lena as a nonactor because she failed to report the sexual 
harassment formally. Because we know that women employees do not complain 
but do take many other steps in response to sexual harassment,289 the court’s 
focus on formal reporting alone necessarily focuses on an absence of action by 
the employee. Yet, women are taking other important mitigating actions to avoid 
harm, as discussed above.290 Until courts properly analyze the “avoid harm 
otherwise” component of the affirmative defense and consider all harm 
avoidance actions,291 courts will inaccurately construct women employees, such 
as Lena, as nonactors and make incorrect liability determinations. 
B. “Avoid Harm Otherwise” Analysis Present, but Limited
Unlike the above-discussed cases, there are other cases in which courts
actually have analyzed the “avoid harm otherwise” component or at least based 
its liability decision in part on actual harm avoidance. In those cases, however, 
the courts have too narrowly construed “harm” and “avoidance of harm.”292 As 
a result, the courts fail to address comprehensively an employee’s mitigation of 
all of her damages resulting from sexual harassment. Such a failure is usually due 
288. Id. at 1286; see also, e.g., Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1292
(11th Cir. 2003) (stating that employee avoids harm by filing complaint). See also supra note 28-29 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of employees’ typical responses to sexual harassment. 
289. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of externally focused harm avoidance mechanisms.
290. Id. 
291. See supra Part III.B.4 for a discussion of Lena’s harm avoidance responses. 
292. See Walton, 347 F.3d at 1289-91 (concluding that plaintiff’s fear of retaliation was not
sufficient justification for her failure to report and “avoid harm otherwise”); Mays v. City Sch. Bd., 5 F. 
App’x 181, 182 n.2 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that plaintiff’s claim failed because, inter alia, she did not 
avoid contact with alleged harasser after supervisor instructed her to do so); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 
388, 397 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff failed to “avoid harm otherwise” when she failed to 
avoid harasser, despite her formal complaint); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(considering only corrective mechanisms designed to stop sexual harassment in “avoid harm 
otherwise” analysis); Cromer-Kendall v. District of Columbia, 326 F. Supp. 2d 50, 64 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(holding that plaintiff defeated affirmative defense by reporting harassment, and thus defendant failed 
to show that plaintiff did not “avoid harm otherwise”); Rodriguez v. City of Houston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 
691, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that “avoid harm otherwise” component does not require plaintiff 
to vacate her job position that subjects her to daily contact with harasser); Taylor v. United Reg’l 
Health Care Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 700CV145-R, 2001 WL 1012803, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2001) 
(defining “avoid harm otherwise” as requiring employee to provide notice of sexual harassment to 
employer); Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1178 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (finding “avoid harm 
otherwise” to be jury question where woman complained about sexual harassment to friend, who was 
also manager in company); Green v. Servicemaster Co., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1013-14 (N.D. Iowa 1999) 
(denying employer’s summary judgment motion due to factual dispute as to whether plaintiff’s 
complaint to union steward was attempt to “avoid harm otherwise”).  
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to the courts’ lack of consideration of the broad range of harms and harm 
avoidance behaviors rather than a rejection of their relevance to the liability 
determination under the affirmative defense. For instance, in Speaks v. City of 
Lakeland,293 the court found that the plaintiff failed to use the employer’s 
complaint procedure.294 Therefore, the court found that “[m]ost, if not all, of the 
harm to Plaintiff could have been avoided by Plaintiff simply reporting [her 
supervisor] at the beginning of the harassment.”295 The court did not explore 
whether certain harms, such as employment, emotional, or psychological harms, 
were mitigated by the plaintiff’s decision to not report. In addition, the court did 
not discuss whether the plaintiff took other actions in order to decrease the 
harassment itself. Rather, because the plaintiff did not report the harassment, 
the court granted summary judgment to the employer because the “[p]laintiff did 
not exercise reasonable care to avoid sexual harassment by [the supervisor] or 
otherwise avoid harm.”296 Unfortunately, the Speaks court is not alone in merely 
providing lip service to the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the affirmative 
defense and thereby failing to analyze fully all the harms and harm avoidance 
actions taken by the employee. 
Regarding the concept of “harm,” courts have almost uniformly failed to 
pay attention to the diversity of harms suffered by victims of sexual harassment. 
To the extent that courts are looking to whether a plaintiff mitigated “harm,” the 
majority of courts have employed an inappropriately narrow construction to 
include the acts of sexual harassment only.297 In a couple of cases, courts have 
acknowledged that one of the harms resulting from sexual harassment is ongoing 
contact with the harassing supervisor.298 Several courts have also recognized that 
psychological trauma is a harm resulting from sexual harassment.299 One case 
even cited to plaintiff’s lack of employment as a harm.300 Yet on the rare 
293. 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (M.D. Fla. 2004). 
294. Speaks, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1229. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. 
297. See, e.g., Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 1999) (equating “harm” to sexual
harassment); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1999) (failing to define “harm” explicitly 
but implicitly equating “harm” to sexual harassment); Duhé v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. Civ.A. 03-746, 
2004 WL 439890, at *16 (E.D. La. Mar. 9, 2004) (equating harm to actionable hostile work 
environment); Taylor v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 700CV145-R, 2001 WL 
1012803, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2001) (equating “harm” to sexual harassment); Green v. 
Servicemaster Co., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1013-14 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (reading “harm” as synonymous 
with sexual harassment). 
298. Cf. Rodriguez v. City of Houston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 691, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (recognizing
implicitly harm that results from continued contact with supervisor but finding that employee need not 
leave job to “avoid harm”).  
299. See Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1289-91 (11th Cir. 2003)
(recognizing that severe sexual harassment “can be particularly traumatic”); Reed v. MBNA Mktg. 
Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2003) (recognizing that reporting sexual harassment is scary, 
uncomfortable, and painful); see also Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1307 
(11th Cir. 2007) (citing Walton and Reed for proposition that reporting sexual harassment can be 
extremely unpleasant).  
300. Mueller v. McGrath Lexus of Chi., No. 02 C0021, 2003 WL 21688230, at *9 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 
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occasions when the courts have recognized broader harms, the courts usually fail 
to credit the plaintiff with having attempted to balance her harms by taking 
action that might decrease some harms while not affecting or increasing other 
harms. This failure is especially true if the plaintiff has chosen an action that may 
decrease her emotional harm but results in her failure to report the sexual 
harassment.301 
Similarly, on the all too rare occasions when the courts have actually paid 
attention to the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the affirmative defense, 
they have also too narrowly determined which actions to credit as harm 
avoiding.302 Such limitations are most likely due to the fact that the majority of 
courts, as discussed above, have analyzed only a limited universe of harms to be 
avoided.303 
To the extent that “avoiding harm” has been discussed, most courts have 
acknowledged only a plaintiff’s reporting of the sexual harassment to her 
employer pursuant to the official policy against sexual harassment as “avoiding 
harm.”304 At times, the courts have recognized other reporting actions as 
2003). 
301. Walton, 347 F.3d at 1290 (holding that even though reporting sexual harassment can be
traumatic, employer will not be held liable because plaintiff’s failure to report precluded employer 
from being able to correct sexual harassment); Reed, 333 F.3d at 35 (noting that employee’s “painful 
effort” of reporting sexual harassment is necessary to impose liability on employer); see also Brown, 
184 F.3d at 390-91, 397 (finding that plaintiff failed to avoid harm even though she reported 
harassment because plaintiff, in order to protect her employment, did not avoid harasser); Chamallas, 
supra note 13, at 384-85 (discussing courts’ tendency to undervalue emotional harm by not seeing it as 
related to economic harm and also job-related injury).  
302. It should be noted that many courts explicitly or implicitly have recognized that the
employer cannot satisfy the employee-focused prong if the employee had availed herself of either the 
employer-provided preventive or corrective mechanisms or avoided harm otherwise. See, e.g., Watts v. 
Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that either employer complaint or union 
complaint can satisfy employee-focused prong). Such a decision is logical because the affirmative 
defense language clearly requires the employer to prove that plaintiff both failed to use the complaint 
mechanism and to avoid harm otherwise. There is one case, however, that held that an employer 
satisfied the employee-focused prong because the employee had only availed herself of the policy and 
had not avoided harm otherwise. Brown, 184 F.3d at 397 (holding that “or” in employee-focused 
prong requires employer to prove only one of two components in prong; therefore, despite fact that 
plaintiff had complained pursuant to policy, because she socialized with her supervisor and was 
sexually harassed again by him, she had failed to avoid harm and no liability would attach). Another 
case decided that whether a plaintiff “avoided harm otherwise” is only relevant to the liability 
determination under the affirmative defense if it justified the employee’s failure to report the sexual 
harassment. Williams v. Multnomah Educ. Serv. Dist., No. CIV. 97-1197-ST, 1999 WL 454633, at *10 
(D. Or. Apr. 14, 1999). The Brown and Williams cases are rightly outliers given the animating policy 
behind the affirmative defense of avoiding harm. 
303. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the broad range of harms that can result from sexual
harassment. 
304. See, e.g., Duhé v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. Civ.A. 03-746, 2004 WL 439890, at *16 (E.D. La.
Mar. 9, 2004) (“If the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of the employer’s preventive or 
remedial apparatus, she should not recover damages that could have been avoided if she had done 
so.”). As noted infra Part V.B, equating the reporting of sexual harassment with avoidance of harm is 
ironic considering that social science research has shown that employer policies, complainant 
reporting, and employer investigations do not necessarily reduce sexual harassment. Grossman, 
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“avoiding harm otherwise” if they provided some form of notice to the 
employer.305 For instance, a few courts have found that even though plaintiff’s 
reporting did not technically comply with the employer’s policy because plaintiff 
complained to a manager not identified in the employer’s sexual harassment 
policy, plaintiff’s actions “avoided harm otherwise” because they notified the 
employer of the harassment.306 Despite interpreting victims’ actions favorably, 
this interpretation inappropriately limits the “avoid harm otherwise” component. 
As the Supreme Court designed the employee-focused prong to increase harm 
avoidance, all forms of harm avoidance, not just notifying the employer, should 
be analyzed.307 
Other courts have correctly analyzed the “avoiding harm otherwise” 
component by recognizing any action that is aimed at avoiding harm. For 
instance, courts have recognized that grieving the sexual harassment to one’s 
union can constitute “avoiding harm otherwise” because it is a corrective 
mechanism aimed at avoiding the harm of harassment.308 Some courts also have 
acknowledged, on occasion, plaintiff’s actions to avoid the harassing supervisor 
himself as relevant to the “avoid harm otherwise” component.309 One court 
identified that whether a plaintiff stayed in or quit her job was relevant to 
“avoiding harm otherwise.”310 Nevertheless, the courts’ analyses are incomplete 
because they primarily recognize harm avoidance actions only for their effect on 
sexual harassment and not on any other harms. 
Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 3. 
305. See Fields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., No. 03-cv-4222-JPG, 2006 WL 2645200, at *15 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 
12, 2006) (finding that employee’s technical compliance with policy that permitted reports to EEOC or 
employer still constituted unreasonable failure to make use of policy in way that would provide 
employer with notice); EEOC v. V & J Foods, Inc., No. 05-C-194, 2006 WL 3203713, at *7-8 (E.D. 
Wis. Nov. 3, 2006), rev’d, 507 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2007) (requiring employee to provide notice to 
employer to meet employee affirmative defense). But see infra Part V.B for a discussion and critique 
of the notice requirement. 
306. See, e.g., Taylor v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 700CV145-R, 2001 WL
1012803, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2001) (applying test where actions to “avoid harm” entail notifying 
management of harassment, including notifying managers outside of formal complaint mechanism); 
Cherry v. Menard, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1178 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (concluding that actions to “avoid 
harm” may include complaining to manager not identified in formal complaint mechanism, even if 
manager is friend). 
307. See supra Part I for a discussion of the Supreme Court’s employee-focused prong as
articulated in Faragher and Ellerth. 
308. See, e.g., Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that actions to
“avoid harm” include filing union grievance); Green v. Servicemaster Co., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1013-14 
(N.D. Iowa 1999) (finding that filing union grievance can be avoiding harm otherwise). 
309. E.g., Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that plaintiff failed to
“avoid harm” because she socialized with supervisor); Rodriguez v. City of Houston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 
691, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that plaintiff need not vacate her job position that subjects her to 
daily contact with harasser in order to “avoid harm” effectively). 
310. Mueller v. McGrath Lexus of Chi., No. 02 C 0021, 2003 WL 21688230, at *9 (N.D. Ill. July
17, 2003) (holding that plaintiff’s quitting of her job despite fact that sexual harassment had ceased was 
failure to avoid harm). 
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A good example of the courts’ general failure to analyze fully all harms 
when analyzing harm avoidance acts is Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Services, 
Inc.311 In Walton, the court correctly identified that there were multiple, relevant 
harms resulting from the sexual harassment.312 Specifically, the court recognized 
that the sexual harassment was one harm and the psychological trauma was 
another.313 Nonetheless, the court only credited as “harm avoidance” actions 
taken by the plaintiff those actions it determined would have eradicated the 
sexual harassment.314 As a result, the court dismissed the relevance of plaintiff’s 
psychological trauma being exacerbated as a result of reporting the 
harassment.315 This court’s narrowing of harm avoidance, though inappropriate, 
is not surprising given the multitude of court decisions that fail to properly 
recognize all harms and harm avoidance when making liability determinations. 
Courts that either ignore an “avoiding harm” analysis altogether or 
narrowly construe harm avoidance are incorrectly analyzing the affirmative 
defense. As discussed earlier, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton316 and Ellerth v. 
Burlington Industries, Inc.,317 the Supreme Court’s analysis made clear that harm 
avoidance is the motivating principle for liability determinations for supervisor 
sexual harassment.318 Without properly analyzing all of the harms and the ways 
in which they are avoided, the courts fail to credit employees with their full range 
of harm avoidance. 
V. RECONCEPTUALIZING “AVOID HARM OTHERWISE”
This Part explores how the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the 
affirmative defense should be discussed and analyzed in liability determinations 
of supervisor sexual harassment cases. 
A. “Avoiding Harm Otherwise”
In order to determine liability, an employer must show that it “exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing 
behavior” and that the “employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid 
harm otherwise.”319 If the employee utilized the employer’s mechanisms, then 
the employer has failed to meet its burden and liability should attach, regardless 
of whether she avoided any other harm in any other way. The reason for this 
311. 347 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2003). 
312. Walton, 347 F.3d at 1290. 
313. Id. at 1283. 
314. Id. at 1290. 
315. Id. at 1290-91. 
316. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
317. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
318. See supra notes 51-85 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the Faragher and 
Ellerth cases. 
319. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
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result is that the employer has supposedly, in part, created the policy to avoid the 
harm of harassment. Therefore, if the employee avails herself of reporting, she 
satisfies what the employer thought was necessary to avoid harm. 
On the other hand, assuming that the employee unreasonably failed to use 
the employer’s process for reporting the sexual harassment, the employer should 
still be required to show that plaintiff did not avoid harm otherwise. This inquiry 
should explore all of the harms identified by the case law, social science research, 
and workplace studies.320 As stated earlier in this Article, these harms should 
include the sexual harassment; the stigma of discrimination; the resulting 
tangible job harm, such as termination or nonpromotion; the resulting intangible 
job harm, such as an abusive work environment and loss of employment 
advancement; economic harm; and emotional, psychological, and physical harms. 
In response to these harms, women who are sexually harassed utilize a wide 
range of strategies to avoid these harms, such as avoiding the harasser, objecting 
to the harasser, formally complaining about the sexual harassment, seeking 
support from friends and family, and ignoring thoughts about the sexual 
harassment and denying that the harassment occurred.321 And of course, because 
one harm avoidance strategy may decrease one type of harm while increasing 
another, the determination of liability based on “avoid harm otherwise” requires 
a court to weigh the various strategies employed and their effectiveness in 
mitigating damages in the aggregate, as required by the avoidable consequences 
doctrine.322 
The support for a robust “avoid harm otherwise” analysis is grounded in the 
rationale for the affirmative defense, the avoidable consequences doctrine, and 
damages theory. In addition, it is supported by the social science and workplace 
studies that document employees’ harms from sexual harassment and their 
coping mechanisms to diminish these harms. And because the courts more often 
than not have ignored the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the employee-
focused prong of the affirmative defense, no body of case law has systematically 
defined the contours of this component and its role in liability determinations. 
Any cases that have identified competing harms and strategies of harm 
avoidance323 have not thoroughly explored the social science research and the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning behind the affirmative defense when dismissing the 
emotional and other harms that can result from making an official sexual 
harassment complaint. As a result, this area has been underexplored. 
Employees, employers, lawyers, and courts should begin to analyze all of the 
harms resulting from sexual harassment and whether the employee has 
attempted to mitigate them. 
320. See supra Part III.A for a listing and discussion of the different types of harms. 
321. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of harm avoidance mechanisms. 
322. See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of the analyses used in assessing liability when based on 
the “avoid harm otherwise” doctrine. 
323. E.g., Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003)
(identifying competing harms and strategies of harm avoidance). 
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For instance, in Lena’s case, as discussed above, Lena has been subjected to 
multiple harms and she has taken multiple actions to avoid harm. Lena has 
suffered the sexual harassment of being touched by Dave on her thighs, lower 
back, and arms. She has also suffered the intangible job harm of having her 
complaint about the sexual harassment be discounted by Victor when he made a 
joke of the sexual harassment. In addition, she is worried about being ostracized 
at work if she complains to her other coworkers because she thinks they too will 
not take it seriously. She is also worried about losing her job if she complains 
further. In addition, Lena is suffering other work harm with direct economic 
consequences in that she is taking more sick leave than she ever has in the past 
and she is not volunteering for, and is even turning down, overtime work. Her 
less frequent attendance and willingness to work overtime may also be causing 
her supervisors and colleagues to view her as less enthusiastic about her position 
or even not a team player. She is also suffering lost joy in her work, she feels 
dread about going to work, and she is on edge. These effects constitute the 
emotional harms that she is suffering. Finally, she is suffering the physical harms 
of loss of appetite and difficulty in sleeping. 
As stated above, to deal with these harms, Lena has acted in many different 
ways. She employed externally focused coping mechanisms to avoid harm. She 
physically avoided Dave by calling in sick, not working overtime, and asking 
Dave to meet with her in the cubicle. She also avoided conflict by moving her 
body away from Dave to prevent him from being able to touch her rather than 
confronting him about his inappropriate touchings. She did complain to Victor, 
the acting director of the department when Dave was absent. Although he was 
not the official to whom she was supposed to make an official complaint, he was 
someone she trusted to reveal the harassment. In addition, Lena sought social 
support by talking with Karen about her treatment by Dave and its impact on 
Lena’s health and attitude toward work. Lena also reattributed what Dave did to 
her as accidental or just informality.  
As discussed above, the research shows that Lena’s harm avoidance 
mechanisms might be effective in diminishing various harms but might increase 
other harms.324 Looking at just one of her behaviors, her avoidance of Dave, the 
number of questions that need to be answered becomes apparent. These 
questions include: How did the physical moving away from Dave impact the 
sexual harassment in frequency, manner, and severity? How did it impact her 
emotional harm, such as her feeling on edge? How did it impact her appetite and 
sleeping? How, if at all, did it impact her work relationships with coworkers? 
When she was able to meet with Dave in her cubicle, was she less inclined to 
take sick leave or more likely to take on overtime work? For each harm 
avoidance mechanism, similar questions arise that are both fact specific to Lena’s 
situation as well as to the larger research findings of the interaction between 
harm avoidance actions and harms. 
But throughout this process, one thing does become clear. By exploring 
these questions, we develop a more complex view of Lena. What emerges is a 
324. See supra Part III.B.4 for a discussion of Lena’s harm avoidance mechanisms. 
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picture of Lena as an actor, not one who is passive and simply submitting to the 
sexual harassment. For this reason alone, and despite the many questions 
remaining, there is value in exploring all of Lena’s harms and harm avoidance 
actions. By the end of the inquiry, there should be a more reliable understanding 
of whether liability should attach to the employer because of Lena’s attempts to 
avoid harm as required under the avoidable consequences doctrine. 
B. “Avoiding Harm Otherwise” Should Not Always Require Notice to the
Employer
The preceding section discussed this Article’s proposal for crediting an 
employee with her harm avoidance actions in determining liability for supervisor 
sexual harassment. It is true that, under this harm avoidance proposal, there 
might be times in which an employer will be held liable despite having no notice 
of the sexual harassment. Such a result is not problematic, as the liability 
determination must focus on harm avoidance rather than employer knowledge. 
A harm avoidance focus comports with the underlying avoidable consequences 
rationale of the affirmative defense and broader liability framework for 
supervisor sexual harassment. Accordingly, the focus should be on whether the 
action taken was reasonably calculated to avoid the harms from sexual 
harassment. Within this analysis, notice to the employer needs to be examined as 
to whether it actually avoids harms. As explained below, employer notice does 
not necessarily avoid all the harms of sexual harassment and therefore cannot, 
without more, be a prerequisite for attaching liability to the employer.325 
For many reasons, the assumption that employers who receive reports of 
sexual harassment then act to stop the harassment is not necessarily true. For 
instance, there have been many studies that show that rather than decreasing 
harassment, such reports may instead cause retaliatory adverse treatment of the 
complainant.326 In addition, Martha Chamallas has shown that employees who 
lodge formal complaints of sexual harassment suffer subsequent work-related 
325. Even if there could be agreement that notice to employers about sexual harassment would
decrease harassment in the workplace, it is not clear that employer policies laying out complaint 
mechanisms are, or could ever be, effective on their own in providing employer notice. For instance, 
Joanna Grossman explains that there is no social science research to support the assumption that 
requiring victims of harassment to complain pursuant to company antiharassment policies, without 
also grappling with such things as gender balance in the workplace, organizational power, and 
treatment of prior complainants, will actually increase the reporting of incidents because the least 
likely response to harassment is for an employee to complain. Grossman, Culture of Compliance, 
supra note 6, at 23, 52-56; see also Chamallas, supra note 13, at 374 (noting that it is “atypical” for 
victims to file internal complaint even when incident is grievous enough to ultimately lead to legal 
action). The fact that an employer policy does not always result in increased formal reporting and thus 
a deterrence of sexual harassment is not surprising. As David Sherwyn and his coauthors argue, the 
requirement that employees provide notice to employers in order to attach liability actually provides 
employers with the incentive to create policies hoping no employee will ever use them. Sherwyn, 
Heise & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1294. 
326. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 375 (citing two different studies showing that large percentage
of employees who complained about sexual harassment—thirty-three percent in one study and sixty-
one percent in another—also suffered subsequent retaliation). 
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harms because they are often viewed as troublemakers and ostracized by 
coworkers.327 
Such treatment underscores the reality that it is the workplace’s informal 
organization, not its formal organization of reporting and investigation 
procedures, that controls the environment and the occurrence of sexual 
harassment in the workplace.328 Chamallas explains that the ineffectiveness of 
formal grievance procedures is due in part to the fact that such procedures are 
created in order to protect employers from liability, not to seek justice for civil 
rights violations.329 Specifically, the procedures: 
allow the employer to control the process and assure that compliance 
does not interfere with the employer’s other more pressing interests. 
The decisionmaker is not neutral in the sense of not being accountable 
to either side; rather, the person assigned to resolve the dispute is an 
employee of the potential defendant who has an interest in minimizing 
the extent of the conflict, saving the image of the employer, and 
maintaining smooth relationships. His or her main job is to insulate the 
employer from legal liability, a goal that may not always coincide with 
cutting down on the incidence of sexual harassment.330  
Finally, there are other reasons why formal reporting to the employer, and 
thus notice itself, does not necessarily decrease the incidence of sexual 
harassment. The formalization of the complaint processing has resulted in many 
complaint processing officials who may not understand sexual harassment law 
and how it fits into the broader civil rights policies and laws.331 As a result, they 
receive the complaints and try to problem-solve them as “personality clashes” 
rather than view the complaints as part of a pattern of systemic discrimination.332 
And the way in which these complaints are processed further isolates complaints 
to individual acts of harassment. This isolation results because it is very common 
for the employer to require that the harassed employee agree to keep her 
harassment confidential as part of the processing of her complaint.333 As a result, 
the confidentiality obligation limits the employee’s opportunity to discuss her 
harassment with other employees who might be similarly affected and could 
otherwise come forward to show a larger pattern of harassment.334 In the end, an 
isolated incident of harassment is less likely to be eradicated aggressively or 
327. Id. at 376. 
328. Id. at 377-78; see also Marshall, supra note 178, at 85-86 (noting critics’ opinions that internal 
procedures “are susceptible to the prejudices and power disparities that exist in organizations”). As 
Chamallas states, “[w]hether an organization discourages or tolerates harassment may have more to 
do with the personal style and commitments of top managers than the formal policies in the employee 
handbook.” Chamallas, supra note 13, at 378. 
329. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 379. 
330. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
331. Id. at 379-80. 
332. Id. at 379; see also Marshall, supra note 178, at 86, 115-16 (showing that, ultimately,
employees’ rights are reinterpreted from civil rights to management interests). 
333. See Chamallas, supra note 13, at 379 (noting that internal grievance procedures often deal
with complaints confidentially). 
334. Id. 
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disciplined than a pattern of systemic sexual harassment that is impacting the 
civil rights of numerous female employees. Because of the culture of formal 
complaint processing, notice itself does not necessarily decrease the incidence of 
sexual harassment. Accordingly, because there is no definitive correlative 
relationship between notice and the deterrence of sexual harassment, Theresa 
Beiner questions whether courts should even credit the employer with a defense 
to liability when there is a lack of “notice.”335 
There are numerous examples in case law as well that show that notice by 
itself does not always eradicate sexual harassment in the workplace. For 
instance, in Cerros v. Steel Technologies, Inc.,336 despite plaintiff telling the 
supervisors and the plant manager about the harassment, the company failed to 
correct the harassment or deter future harassment, thus failing to deter the act of 
sexual harassment.337 
As shown above, notice does not necessarily avoid the harm of sexual 
harassment itself. In addition, notice may not have any impact on the mitigation 
of the employee’s other harms, such as other employment-related, economic, 
emotional, psychological, and physical harms.338 Therefore, notice cannot and 
should not monopolize the analysis of the “avoid harm otherwise” component of 
the affirmative defense. 
Below is a discussion of one court’s flawed reasoning that notice to the 
employer of the harassment automatically translates into the cessation of the 
harassment and that, therefore, such notice is the only meaningful manner by 
which an employee can avoid her harms. In this case, by giving notice primacy, 
the court improperly limited the manner by which an employee could 
satisfactorily “avoid harm otherwise” because such reasoning ignored other 
cognizable harms and appropriate manners to mitigate those harms.339 In Fields 
v. Illinois Department of Corrections,340 the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) had a sexual harassment policy that permitted the targeted employee
to report the sexual harassment to the IDOC or to file a complaint with the
EEOC.341 Ms. Gunn, one of the plaintiffs in this case, chose the option that
permitted her to file an EEOC complaint rather than file an internal IDOC
complaint.342 The court stated that under the affirmative defense, “[t]he
requirement that an employee report sexually harassing conduct arises out of her
335. Beiner, Women’s Stories, supra note 6, at 143-44. 
336. 398 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2005). 
337. Cerros, 398 F.3d at 953-54. 
338. See supra notes 325-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of notice on
avoidance of other harms. 
339. Fields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., No. 03-cv-4222-JPG, 2006 WL 2645200, at *15 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 
2006). 
340. No. 03-cv-4222-JPG, 2006 WL 2645200, at *15 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2006). 
341. Fields, 2006 WL 2645200, at *15. Specifically, the court found that “the policy urged
employees to use the internal complaint process to obtain a resolution to sexual harassment 
complaints, [but] it also allowed an employee to proceed directly to the Illinois Department of Human 
Rights or the Equal Employment Opportunity.” Id. at *2.  
342. Id. at *15. 
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duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm.”343 The court continued that “‘the 
law against sexual harassment is not self-enforcing and an employer cannot be 
expected to correct harassment unless the employee makes a concerted effort to 
inform the employer that a problem exists.’”344 Accordingly, the court 
determined that in filing a complaint with the EEOC, rather than reporting the 
harassment to the employer, plaintiff had failed to use the employer-provided 
measure that would stop the harassment.345  
The Fields court’s reasoning is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s duty to avoid 
harm.346 The court failed to identify that although the employer’s burden under 
the affirmative defense is to attack the sexually harassing behavior, it is the 
plaintiff’s job to avoid her harms and that avoidance can be done by following 
the employer’s policy, which in fact the plaintiff did do here, or by other actions. 
In dismissing Ms. Gunn’s decision to complain to the EEOC rather than the 
IDOC, the court stated that plaintiff’s “technical compliance” with the IDOC’s 
policy was irrelevant and instead the “question is whether [Gunn] unreasonably 
failed to use measures available to her to try to stop the harassment.”347 The 
court continued that “[t]he evidence is clear that [Gunn] failed to use those 
measures—whether they be an internal complaint or an EEOC charge—in a 
timely manner to attempt to give IDOC notice of the harassment and to give it 
an opportunity to stop it.”348 The court’s analysis in effect erased the broad 
principle of avoiding harm and required instead that the necessary employee 
actions for attaching liability to the employer were only those that gave the 
employer enough timely information about the ongoing sexual harassment for 
the employer to actually stop the harassment. 
Beyond inappropriately limiting the range of harm avoidance actions to 
notice, the court failed to discuss any harms other than sexual harassment or any 
satisfactory harm avoidance actions other than filing a timely report. For 
instance, the court did not explore whether the filing of an internal complaint 
would have exacerbated plaintiff’s emotional or psychological harm. Nor did the 
343. Id. (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998); Cerros v. Steel Tech.,
Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 952 (7th Cir. 2005)).  
344. Id. (quoting Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1038 (7th Cir. 1998)
(alteration omitted)).  
345. Fields, 2006 WL 2645200, at *15. 
346. It should be noted that another case, also in the Seventh Circuit, also narrowly construed
harm avoidance. EEOC v. V & J Foods, 2006 WL 3203713, at *7-8 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 3, 2006), rev’d, 507 
F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2007). In V & J Foods, the court again required that the plaintiff provide the
employer with notice in order to satisfy the employee-focused prong of the affirmative defense. Id. at
*7. The court based its decision on the fact that the policy rationale to avoid harm is met only if
plaintiff provided the employer “with the knowledge and the means to avoid future harassment.” Id. 
at *8. For reasons discussed in this Part, such an interpretation of how harm is to be avoided is far too
narrow. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded on the
grounds that burden was on the defendant employer to demonstrate establishment and
implementation of “an effective complaint machinery.” EEOC v. V & J Foods, Inc., 507 F.3d 575, 580
(7th Cir. 2007). 
347. Fields, 2006 WL 2645200, at *15. 
348. Id. 
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court recognize that Gunn took other forms of harm avoidance actions beyond 
her policy-permitted complaint to the EEOC. For instance, Gunn told one of her 
supervisors, Parker, that she was offended by his sexual comments about her 
anatomy,349 she indicated to another one of her supervisors, Turner, that she did 
not appreciate his sexual advances,350 and she filed an IDOC incident report 
about Parker’s sexually inappropriate and offensive conduct.351 In addition, in its 
calculation that Gunn’s failure to file an internal IDOC complaint was an 
unreasonable failure to avoid harm, the court failed to acknowledge Gunn’s 
severe employment-related harms that were created and aggravated by another 
plaintiff’s IDOC internal complaint of sexual harassment that identified Gunn as 
a target of sexual harassment.352 As a result of the other plaintiff’s complaint, 
IDOC subjected Gunn to scrutiny not suffered by other employees that resulted 
in numerous disciplinary actions, including reprimands and suspensions.353 
In sum, the Fields court failed to analyze and consider all harms and harm 
avoidance actions in its liability determination. Although the court’s recognition 
that avoidance of harm was the animating principle for employer liability is a 
correct and important one, the court’s failure to analyze all of Gunn’s harm 
avoidance actions taken to avoid all of the harms resulting from the sexual 
harassment resulted in a liability determination that was not based on the true 
avoidance of harm. 
Accordingly, avoiding harm cannot always be satisfied by notice. In 
addition, by focusing exclusively on whether an employee provided notice of the 
sexual harassment to her employer, courts are failing to acknowledge and 
analyze all of the harms resulting from sexual harassment and all of the strategies 
an employee utilizes that are reasonably calculated to avoid these harms. The 
result is that a liability determination is not being made based on a thorough 
analysis of the harm avoidance principle.354 
349. Id. at *3. 
350. Id. 
351. Id. at *4. 
352. Fields, 2006 WL 2645200, at *4-7. 
353. Id. 
354. Theresa Beiner has provided another argument against a liability standard that requires
notice. Specifically, Beiner has argued that a liability standard that requires notice to the employer of 
any sexual harassment would provide more protection to the employer, who is not a victim here, than 
to the employee, who is the actual victim of sexual harassment. Beiner, Women’s Stories, supra note 6, 
at 141-44. Moreover, it would provide absolutely no Title VII remedy to an employee who was in fact 
sexually harassed and whose workplace was affected. Id. at 144. Beiner has stated that supervisor 
sexual harassment should be considered a cost of business similar to a supervisor’s discriminatory 
firing of an employee. Id. at 145. Accordingly, as no notice is required before liability could attach for 
a discriminatory firing by a supervisor, no notice should be required before liability could attach for 
supervisor sexual harassment. 
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C. Avoiding Harm Should Be More Important than Conciliation as an
Animating Policy Behind the Affirmative Defense
Similarly, in evaluating an employee’s actions under the affirmative defense, 
it is more appropriate to analyze whether those actions serve to avoid the 
employee’s harms from sexual harassment than whether they promote informal 
conciliation. It is true that in articulating the affirmative defense, along with the 
importance of harm avoidance, the Supreme Court noted the importance of 
Congress’s preference for conciliation rather than litigation of Title VII 
violations.355 The Court reasoned that having a policy of nonharassment and a 
mechanism by which an employee could complain would enable the employer to 
resolve informally an employee’s sexual harassment claim.356 As a result, there 
would be fewer charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC and less litigation 
of such complaints in court.357 Despite the underlying rationale for the 
affirmative defense, there are several reasons why conciliation is not necessarily 
promoted by the liability framework and, therefore, whether an employee’s 
actions are analyzed as promoting conciliation should not be the basis for 
liability attachment. 
First, as explained by Chamallas, effective conciliation is not achieved when 
the conciliation decision makers are not neutral.358 The type of conciliation that 
is promoted through the affirmative defense framework is one in which the 
employer is both a party to the conciliation effort and the decision maker.359 This 
structure is flawed because the decision makers are accountable to the employer 
and, therefore, will tend to make decisions that are not based solely on the best 
conciliation outcome for both parties.360 In addition, the employer’s conciliation 
process, as discussed above, is not solely intended to reach an agreement without 
litigation but also to protect the employer from legal liability.361 Further, a true 
conciliation process at its core is intended to provide a speedy remedy to a 
plaintiff.362 Yet employer conciliation mechanisms are often constructed to 
355. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). 
356. Id. 
357. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 145 (2004) (noting that linking employer’s
effective grievance procedures to liability promotes conciliation rather than litigation (citing Ellerth, 
524 U.S. at 764)). In addition, the Court stated that the affirmative defense promoted conciliation in 
another way. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998). Specifically, a liability 
scheme that would find automatic liability for explicit and implicit uses of power by the supervisor 
would encourage litigation rather than conciliation of all supervisor sexual harassment claims. Id. at 
805. Accordingly, because the affirmative defense can preclude strict liability for the class of sexual
harassment claims that do not result in a tangible employment action without conciliation efforts, the
Court would be hindering litigation. Id. 
358. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 379. 
359. Id. 
360. Id. 
361. Id.; see also Marshall, supra note 178, at 86 (noting managers’ competing duties to shield
employer from liability and to redress employee grievances). 
362. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1982) (analyzing lower court’s holding
on premise that conciliation is tool to get remedy to plaintiff quickly because litigation is so slow). 
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ensure the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims by only minimally complying with the 
employer-focused prong of the affirmative defense, thus ensuring that the 
complaint mechanisms are not truly effective in getting the employees to 
complain pursuant to them.363 It is precisely because of these flaws that 
employer-run conciliation is not effective. In fact, under Title VII and previous 
Supreme Court cases, the conciliation goal that is envisioned is one that would 
occur through a neutral entity, such as the EEOC, not the employer.364 
Therefore, under the affirmative defense, it does not make sense to prioritize 
conciliation mechanisms that are operating solely to protect employers from 
liability over harm avoidance mechanisms. 
Second, as discussed earlier, notice should not be a required element of a 
harm avoidance action to be credited to an employee.365 Yet, implicit in the 
conciliation rationale is the notion that an employee subjected to sexual 
harassment would need to provide notice to the employer and an opportunity to 
resolve the complaint prior to any litigation. Conciliation may be a path to harm 
avoidance, but it is not the only or most effective one. 
Finally, it is important to note that despite the conciliation rationale, the 
affirmative defense does not bar liability in all instances where conciliation with 
the employer is not attempted. For instance, if the sexual harassment is one 
severe act of sexual harassment, such as a supervisor raping an employee, then 
the affirmative defense would not bar liability even though there was no 
opportunity to provide notice by reporting that rape and conciliate the claim 
before the sexual harassment had occurred.366 Accordingly, for the reasons 
discussed above, conciliation cannot be the primary motivating rationale over 
harm avoidance in deciding affirmative defense cases when it is merely a pretext 
363. See Chamallas, supra note 13, at 379-80 (noting main goal of internal grievance procedures
is to shield employers from liability and that private enforcement procedures threaten Title VII by 
failing to address reality adequately). 
364. See, e.g., N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 552 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(noting that EEOC executes Title VII’s procedures for conciliation). 
365. See supra Part V.B for a discussion of the reasoning against an employer notice
requirement. 
366. See Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that affirmative
defense, which was “adopted in cases that involved ongoing sexual harassment in a workplace, may 
not protect an employer from automatic liability in cases of single, severe, unanticipatable sexual 
harassment”); see also Watkins v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at *4-5 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (using affirmative defense and finding that employee who waited four months before 
reporting that her supervisor raped her acted unreasonably according to second prong of affirmative 
defense, and, moreover, employer satisfied first prong of defense as it did not fail to exercise 
reasonable care by not anticipating supervisor was potential rapist); id. (noting that when employee 
promptly complains of sexually harassing behavior and employer promptly responds, disciplines the 
harasser, and stops the harassment, there will be no actionable behavior); Indest v. Freeman 
Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 804 n.52 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J., specially concurring) (contending 
that under Faragher and Ellerth, when supervisor engages in “sufficiently severe conduct,” e.g., rape, 
employer may be vicariously liable regardless of timeliness of employer’s response or plaintiff’s 
complaint); Marks, supra note 6, at 1423-28 (discussing fact that some courts have nonetheless held 
that employer should be able to defeat liability by merely establishing employer-focused prong 
without showing that employee complained pursuant to policy under employee-focused prong).  
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for providing notice. 
CONCLUSION 
As seen in this Article, the concepts of employee harms and harm 
avoidance are important to the liability framework for hostile work environment 
sexual harassment by a supervisor. Whether an employer is liable for supervisor 
sexual harassment depends in part on whether the employee avoids her harm or 
mitigates her damages resulting from the sexual harassment. Despite the law’s 
interest in employees’ harm avoidance, courts have failed to explore fully the 
vast array of harms resulting from sexual harassment and the variety of ways in 
which employees avoid these multiple harms. 
This Article reframes the legal discussion of employees’ actions in response 
to sexual harassment from one that almost exclusively focuses on whether the 
employees failed to report the sexual harassment. As discussed above and shown 
through the story of Lena, a limited view of the affirmative defense, one that 
merely considers whether the employer had a policy and whether the employee 
formally complained thereto, constructs women employees as nonactors because 
they do not complain about being sexually harassed. They appear as “silent 
sufferers.”367 And no liability attaches. 
By resuscitating the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the affirmative 
defense, through reliance on the avoidable consequences doctrine, Title VII 
itself, and social science research, women employees’ fuller stories are able to be 
told. They are stories of the employees as active persons, who engage internal 
and external coping mechanisms in order to avoid discrimination as well as other 
employment, economic, emotional, psychological, and physical harms. By doing 
so, their more complete stories can be told and made available for 
determinations pursuant to the liability framework for supervisor sexual 
harassment. 
As a result, the discourse of women’s subordination in the workplace can be 
balanced with the embracing of women’s acts of resistance, choices, self-
definition, and self-direction. By recognizing women’s agency we are creating the 
necessary legal “space”368 between “construction”369 of oneself to 
“determination”370 by oneself. Such a legal space is important for its potential to 
impact women employees, their employers, and the larger legal discourse in the 
courts and in scholarship regarding how women who are sexually harassed are 
367. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 380 (stating that because of inherent flaws in internal grievance 
procedures, employees may not come forward to complain and hence, as in 1970s, are silent sufferers); 
see also Krieger, supra note 6, at 178-79 (observing that early social science research focused only on 
externally focused coping mechanisms to sexual harassment and therefore internally focused strategies 
were considered under the category of “‘ignoring’” or “‘doing nothing’” (citing David E. Terpstra & 
Douglas D. Baker, The Identification and Classification of Reactions to Sexual Harassment, 10 J. ORG. 
BEHAV. 1, 5 (1989))).  
368. Abrams, supra note 36, at 113. 
369. Id. 
370. Id. 
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neither passive nor silent sufferers but rather complex actors. These employees 
act in various ways to avoid the multiple forms of harm resulting from sexual 
harassment. 
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